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Reproductive Selection Bias 
Lauren R. Roth† 
New York University School of Law 
Abstract 
Decades after the advent of assisted reproductive technology (“ART”) 
that allows prospective parents to deselect embryos with grave genetic 
illnesses—a procedure called preimplantation genetic diagnosis (“PGD”)—
it remains a tool largely of upper-class whites. I argue that the time has 
come to focus on closing the access gap in this area of reproductive rights 
in spite of the current political climate. If reproductive liberty is tied to 
equality through access to medical procedures, scholars must finally answer 
the question of what equality requires in a system that permits the use of 
ARTs. 
This Article shows how the current system of assisted reproduction 
already distinguishes between the “in” group and the “out” group. Section 
I explores the literature’s focus on the use and growth of PGD for genetic 
selection unrelated to the prevention of genetic disease (“nontherapeutic 
PGD”), including the use of PGD for sex and other physical-trait selection. 
The scholarly overemphasis on tricky moral quandaries associated with the 
nontherapeutic use of PGD where liberty concerns are at the forefront 
impedes any proposed solutions to unequal access to using PGD to prevent 
inherited illnesses. 
Section II similarly explores how existing jurisprudence ignores the role 
of income inequality and broader social concerns when deciding disputes 
related to PGD. Courts address any negative implications of their decisions 
for the children of those who are able to afford PGD but fail to address the 
impact of their decisions on the children of those who cannot afford PGD. 
Finally, I discuss in Section III how the combined effect of the Affordable 
Care Act (“ACA”) antidiscrimination and essential health benefit mandates 
is to focus on ensuring equality of access to healthcare, particularly for 
underserved populations. While few scholars would argue today that 
reproductive technology is likely to be included among the essential health 
benefits the ACA requires, if the statute remains intact, it is one more 
example of the troublesome class distinctions that currently divide this 
country into “haves” and “have nots.” The reverse eugenics of therapeutic 
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PGD privileges wealthy whites above other races and classes, and it 
exacerbates race and class distinctions. 
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Introduction 
There are many goods and services that the poor cannot afford to buy. 
From decent housing to luxury cars, from new clothes to vacations at the 
beach, their unmet needs and wants are extensive. Through direct subsidies 
and indirect tax credits and deductions, society tries to fill some of these 
unmet needs. Grudgingly or not, completely or not, government programs 
tackle needs including housing, food, and healthcare. 
Given that few would argue that the government is fully meeting these 
basic needs, it is unsurprising that there is currently no public funding for 
advanced fertility treatments for the poor. But this is a case where a 
negative right against government interference in family planning should 
become a positive right to funding to create “healthy” children.1 An 
example can help demonstrate why we should be funding fertility 
treatments instead of—or, ideally, in addition to—investing more in 
housing or education. 
Two couples,2 the Bakers and the Smiths, are looking to conceive a child 
and have an observed family history of Huntington’s disease. At the start, 
 
1. Dorothy E. Roberts, Race and the New Reproduction, 47 HASTINGS L.J. 935, 946 
(1996) [hereinafter Roberts I] (“Reproduction is special. Government policy 
concerning reproduction has tremendous power to affect the status of entire 
groups of people . . . . It is precisely the connection between reproduction and 
human dignity that makes a system of procreative liberty that privileges the 
wealthy and powerful particularly disturbing.”). 
2. I use two heterosexual couples in my example here. The discussion applies equally 
to homosexual couples attempting to use the sperm or eggs of one member with 
a genetic predisposition to an illness or chromosome abnormality. 
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the disease is as prevalent among wealthy families and among poor 
families. Without any additional action, they face the same risk of passing 
the gene for the disease to their offspring. Unfortunately, genetic testing 
reveals that Mother Baker carries the gene and will, absent medical 
intervention, face a fifty-percent risk of passing that gene and the disease 
itself along to her offspring because Huntington’s is a dominant gene.3 
Mother Smith also carries the Huntington’s gene and bears the same risk of 
passing along the gene to her children, but she is poor and, therefore, less 
likely to engage in genetic testing and discover this fact.4 
Even assuming that both families know enough about their history and 
about the disease to have genetic testing done,5 they face very different 
paths forward in conceiving biological children. Although Mother Baker has 
no known fertility problems, she can use in vitro fertilization (“IVF”) to 
produce embryos that will then undergo preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
(“PGD”). With PGD, a single cell (typically) is taken from each embryo in a 
biopsy and tested to see if its DNA contains the gene for the disease.6 By 
selecting embryos without the gene—absent the small risk of human error 
or other reasons for mistakenly implanting an embryo that contains the 
gene for the disease—the Baker family now has a healthy baby with no risk 
of developing Huntington’s disease. 
 
3. For a recessive gene such as cystic fibrosis (CF), a child must inherit two copies of 
the gene (one from each parent who is a carrier of the gene) to manifest the 
disease. The odds of two CF carriers producing a baby with the disease is 25%. 
There is a 50% chance the child will be a CF carrier with one copy of the gene. CF 
Genetics: The Basics, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND., http://www.cff.org/What-is-
CF/Genetics/CF-Genetics-Basics (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). The calculation is more 
complicated for genes such as BRCA1 and BRCA2 that increase the risk of several 
cancers, including breast and ovarian cancer, but do not manifest in the diseases 
with complete certainty. See BRCA1 and BRCA2: Cancer Risk and Genetic Testing, 
NAT’L CANCER INST., http://www.cancer.gov/about-cancer/causes-
prevention/genetics/brca-fact-sheet (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
4. See Drew Anne Scarantino, Would You Pay for Genetic Testing?, FORBES (June 13, 
2013), http://www.forbes.com/sites/learnvest/2013/06/13/would-you-pay-for-
genetic-testing/#17489d9152b3; What is the Cost of Genetic Testing, And How 
Long Does it Take to get the Results?, U.S. NAT’L LIBR. MED., 
http://ghr.nlm.nih.gov/primer/testing/costresults (last visited July 12, 2016) 
(“The cost of genetic testing can range from under $100 to more than $2,000, 
depending on the nature and complexity of the test.”). 
5. See, e.g., Ruqaiijah Yearby, Breaking the Cycle of “Unequal Treatment” with Health 
Care Reform: Acknowledging and Addressing the Continuation of Racial Bias, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 1281, 1296-1301 (2012) (discussing interpersonal racial bias and how 
it “leads to racial disparities in medical treatment”). 
6. See Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis & Screening, N.Y.U. LANGONE MED. CTR., 
http://nyulangone.org/locations/fertility-center/preimplantation-genetic-
diagnosis-screening (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (“Preimplantation genetic diagnosis 
can identify specific genes associated with conditions such as cystic fibrosis, 
hemophilia, Huntington’s disease, Marfan syndrome, muscular dystrophy, 
thalassemia, Tay-Sachs disease, spinal muscular atrophy, and sickle cell anemia.”). 
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The Baker family has spent a lot of money to ensure that Baby Baker is 
healthy, though.7 For that price, the Bakers no longer have to worry about 
their children or their grandchildren inheriting the disease. They also save 
the money needed to treat the disease and care for family members with 
the disease. Although Mother Baker will one day live with Huntington’s 
disease, future Baker generations will not, and they will have no reason to 
lobby for research into treatments for the disease, to donate to related 
charities, or even to walk in the annual event to show solidarity with others 
affected by the disease. The market for future treatments will be a little 
smaller by number and a lot less profitable, assuming that those most likely 
to pay for expensive new treatments will no longer have the disease.8 
If, instead, all members of the two couples here are carriers of cystic 
fibrosis (“CF”), which allows two healthy carriers to each pass a recessive CF 
gene to a child to produce a child with CF, the Baker family can use IVF and 
PGD to nearly eliminate its risk of passing CF to its offspring. The Baker 
 
7. See Marissa A. Mastroianni, Bridging the Gap Between the “Have” and the “Have-
Nots”: The ACA Prohibits Insurance Coverage Discrimination Based Upon Infertility 
Status, 79 ALB. L. REV. 151, 158 (2015-16) (“An average IVF cycle in the United 
States can cost between $10,000 and $15,000 with only a 25-30% live birth 
success rate. Therefore, many couples will need to undergo several IVF cycles to 
achieve their desired outcome.” (footnotes omitted)). Note that these figures 
include only the cost of IVF and not the cost of laboratory work to engage in PGD, 
substantially underestimating the cost of the process. While a number of states 
require health insurance plans to cover infertility treatment, they do not discuss 
the use of IVF and PGD for genetic reasons rather than infertility. In addition, 
wanting to have more than one child results in completing the process multiple 
times. See State Laws Related to Insurance Coverage for Infertility Treatment, 
NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (June 1, 2014) 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/health/insurance-coverage-for-infertility-
laws.aspx (“15 states—Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Illinois, 
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, 
Rhode Island, Texas and West Virginia—have passed laws that require insurers to 
either cover or offer coverage for infertility diagnosis and treatment. Thirteen 
states have laws that require insurance companies to cover infertility 
treatment.”). 
8. See Judith F. Daar, ART and the Search for Perfectionism: On Selecting Gender, 
Genes, and Gametes, 9 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 241, 259-60 (2005) [hereinafter Daar 
I] (“If PGD has the effect of encouraging parents to avoid procreating children with 
identifiable genetic disorders, it is posited that individuals who do suffer from 
these gene-based diseases will face increased discrimination on three fronts. First, 
a public policy that favors ridding the human race of a disease that plagues fewer 
and fewer of our fellow citizens risks ‘orphaning’ the disease, that is, rarity makes 
the disease, and by fiat its host, an outcast in the scientific and health 
communities . . . . Affected individuals will have little hope of seeing a cure, unless 
public monies are expended on behalf of furthering research in the field. Second, 
individuals who are afflicted with a genetic disorder that was susceptible to 
detection by PGD will likely be part of a lower socioeconomic class . . . and thus 
will face further marginalization by society at large . . . . Finally, . . . [i]f an attitude 
develops that ‘certain diseases can and therefore should be avoided,’ persons 
born with such diseases may be perceived as culpable for their own diminished 
health, further discrimination against the disabled.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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family removes itself from the CF population quickly and provides no 
attention or funding to the cause going forward. 
The Smith family, on the other hand, faces a difficult choice. The couple 
is determined to have biological children but cannot afford the cost of IVF, 
let alone the cost of IVF and PGD.9 Depending on insurance and other 
resources, the Smith family can conceive naturally and then test the fetus 
for Huntington’s disease via amniocentesis. Assuming the family can afford 
this procedure, however, any positive test result would require terminating 
the pregnancy if the family does not want to pass on the disease. For the 
Smith family, producing a child without the gene might entail several failed 
pregnancies. 
If the Smith family conceives and does not test for the Huntington’s 
gene using amniocentesis, then they have a fifty-percent chance of passing 
the gene to each of their children. Since the Baker family opted out of the 
disease, the Smith family now—or within a few generations, at least—faces 
a world in which the wealthy do not have the disease and therefore do not 
spend to research the disease and treatments or cures. Among the 
population that was previously equally at risk for developing Huntington’s 
disease, wealthy people now have “healthy” babies who will never develop 
the disease, and poor people have “sick” babies who have a fifty percent 
chance of inheriting the disease.10 
In this Article, I argue that there should be a positive right to the funding 
of fertility treatments for parents with genes that can reduce their 
children’s life expectancy or greatly impair their quality of life. If, at the very 
moment of birth, poor children and wealthy children are not equal because 
money can buy different genetic coding for length and quality of life, then 
there is no hope of equality at any point thereafter. If there is no equality 
at this one moment, then there is no liberty for the poor children who start 
life with a stigma that the wealthy can avoid. While line drawing is always 
difficult and there is a slippery slope, a negative right should become a 
positive right when it is necessary to create all babies equal. 
 
9. Dorothy E. Roberts, The Genetic Tie, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 209, 244 (1995) [hereinafter 
Roberts II] (“The people in the United States most likely to be infertile are older, 
poorer, Black, and poorly educated. Most couples who use IVF services are white, 
highly educated, and affluent. New reproductive technologies are so popular in 
American culture not simply because of the value placed on the genetic tie, but 
because of the value placed on the white genetic tie.” (footnotes omitted)). 
10. See Judith Daar, Panel 2-Reproductive Healthcare Legislation: Where We’ve Been 
and Where We’re Going, 23 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 511, 517 (2013) (“There are also 
some more nuanced arguments about orphaning certain diseases. For example, if 
we were to use PGD to eliminate Down’s Syndrome, then it’s going to be the case 
that not everyone can access PGD because it is expensive and not covered by 
insurance. So you are going to have this sort of binary approach where people 
who are wealthier and can afford PGD will not have kids with these disabilities but 
people who cannot afford PGD are going to have children who do have these 
genetic anomalies.”). 
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Two decades after the advent of the technology that allows us to screen 
out certain genetic diseases—at a time when its use is growing—we stand 
at the precipice of a dramatic increase in social inequalities as a result. At 
this point, we all recognize the importance (politically, if not ethically) of 
reducing social inequality in this country. Scholars advocating for 
reproductive liberty, or procreative liberty, as it is frequently called, have 
focused on reproductive choice and allowing some to use assisted 
reproductive technologies (“ARTs”).11 Yet asserting that ARTs are morally 
justified and should be legally permitted does not address the disparity in 
utilization rates between classes and races.12 
Scholars, particularly Dorothy Roberts and Radhika Rao, have sought to 
advance equality in reproductive liberty, but questioned at times whether 
ARTs should instead be prohibited for all and genetic parentage 
deemphasized.13 I assume here, given the popularity of ARTs among those 
who can afford to use them (largely wealthy whites), that it is unrealistic to 
ban or substantially limit their use in the case of preventing genetic diseases 
in offspring. If liberty is tied to equality, scholars must finally answer the 
question of what equality requires in a system that permits the use of ARTs. 
I propose that we move beyond the current discussions of morality and 
legality of new ARTs because existing technology shows that we cannot 
achieve reproductive equality without a positive right to government 
funding. This Article details how the lack of funding for ARTs already 
distinguishes between the “in” group and the “out” group—the 
unfortunate other who lead supposedly lesser, wrongful lives in comparison 
to those with access to ARTs. The law can and should help close the gap 
 
11. See Andrew B. Coan, Assisted Reproductive Equality: An Institutional Analysis, 60 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143, 1144-45 (noting that most scholars have focused on 
whether constitutional protection of procreative liberty should be extended to 
ARTs and “[i]f so, which ones, and in what circumstances”). 
12. Mastroianni, supra note 7, at 162 (“Secondly, the patient ‘profile’ for individuals 
seeking infertility treatment is worrisome, especially because the right to 
procreate is a fundamental right recognized by the United States Supreme Court. 
The statistics show a positive correlation of infertility treatment usage with higher 
household income and higher education levels. According to one study, ‘[t]here is 
an 11 percent chance that low-income women will pursue ART, while high-income 
women are almost twice as likely to do so.’ Thus, a divide between the ‘haves’ and 
the ‘have-nots’ based upon these socioeconomic factors is suspect to the say the 
least.” (footnotes omitted)). There is no reason to think that the utilization rates 
for PGD are any higher among those with lower incomes than for IVF alone. In 
fact, given the cost of PGD, there is reason to believe that the utilization rates for 
IVF and PGD show greater socioeconomic disparities. 
13. Radhika Rao, Equal Liberty: Assisted Reproductive Technology and Reproductive 
Equality, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1457, 1478-79 (2008) (arguing that it would be 
constitutional to ban the use of ARTs for all); Roberts I, supra note 1, at 947-49 
(“Black women in particular would be better served by a focus on the basic 
improvement of conditions that lead to infertility , such as occupational and 
environmental hazards, diseases, and complications following childbirth and 
abortion.”). 
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under the ACA,14 particularly given that reverse eugenics privileges the 
wealthy and disproportionately white above other races and classes. I use 
PGD here as a lens to focus on ARTs more generally. 
Section I of this Article will explore the literature’s focus on the use and 
growth of PGD for genetic selection unrelated to the prevention of genetic 
disease (“nontherapeutic PGD”), including the use of PGD for sex and other 
physical-trait selection. Given that most people cannot afford the more 
urgently needed therapeutic use of PGD (about which there are fewer 
moral and legal concerns), the scholarly emphasis on the nontherapeutic 
use of PGD and novel challenges to reproductive liberty is misplaced. In fact, 
the overemphasis on tricky moral quandaries associated with the 
nontherapeutic use of PGD, where liberty concerns are at the forefront, 
impedes any proposed solutions to unequal access to using PGD to prevent 
grave, inherited illnesses. I argue that liberty is intertwined with equity 
where it produces “sick” children who could otherwise be born “healthy.” 
A negative right becomes a positive right to funding for ARTs where poor 
children will otherwise suffer illness and social stigma that is preventable 
before birth. 
Section II explores how existing jurisprudence ignores the role of 
income inequality and broader social concerns in deciding disputes related 
to PGD. Courts have slowly begun to resolve the disputes that arise when 
the use of PGD for the prevention of genetic disease goes awry, including 
custody disputes over embryos. A growing body of literature addresses the 
use of a tort law claim for wrongful life when a doctor or lab’s mistake 
results in the conception of a baby with a genetic disease that could have 
been prevented absent negligence. More enthralled with this tort theory 
than are the courts, scholars have largely overlooked the implications that 
any successful wrongful life claims would have for those without access to 
therapeutic PGD. In family law disputes over custody of embryos, the 
weight courts have placed on having a healthy, genetic child again 
advantages those who can afford therapeutic PGD and stigmatizes those 
who cannot. 
I argue in Section III that equal access to PGD and to all ARTs is more 
important than ever because of the likelihood that key pieces of the ACA 
will be repealed. If Congress and the President repeal the ACA’s individual 
mandate, it will make the popular provision that prevents insurance plans 
from rejecting individuals with pre-existing medical conditions or charging 
them higher premiums difficult to maintain as young, healthy consumers 
opt out of health insurance.15 The ACA’s mandates can help bridge the gap 
 
14. Health Care and Education and Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
(PPACA), Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (jointly “ACA”). 
15. See Margot Sanger-Katz, Why Keeping Only the Popular Parts of Obamacare Won’t 
Work, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2016), 
http://www.mobile.nytimes.com/2016/11/15/upshot/why-keeping-only-the-
popular-parts-of-obamacare-wont-work.html?_r=0 (discussing inevitable cycle of 
increasing premiums and decreasing enrollment in insurance markets that 
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between classes and between the healthy and the sick. Section 1557 of the 
ACA prohibits discrimination in health insurance on the basis of health 
status, race, and sex.16 In addition, the ACA requires the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services to “take into account the health care needs of diverse 
segments of the population, including women, children, persons with 
disabilities, and other groups” when defining essential health benefits 
(“EHBs”).17 The combined effect of these mandates is to focus on ensuring 
equality of access to healthcare for all, particularly underserved 
populations. Reproductive technology should be a key area in the 
discussion of how to define EHBs, and the illustration of therapeutic PGD 
demonstrates why. There is an administrative law solution that creates 
healthy children who society does not stigmatize because of their 
preventable genetic conditions, assuming the ACA—or at least its goals—
remain intact. 
I. Using PGD to Select Babies 
Courts have broadly affirmed the right to procreate and the right to be 
free from government intervention into personal matters, including the 
bearing of a child (a negative right).18 Scholars have moved down the 
 
prohibit discrimination against those with pre-existing conditions but do not have 
an individual mandate forcing the young and healthy to buy insurance). 
16. PPACA § 1557 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18116) (“Except as otherwise provided for 
in this title . . . an individual shall not, on the ground prohibited under title VI of 
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d et seq.), title IX of the Education 
Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 et seq.), the Age Discrimination Act of 1975 
(42 U.S.C. 6101 et seq.), or section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. 
794), be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 
to discrimination under, any health program or activity, any part of which is 
receiving Federal financial assistance, including credits, subsidies, or contracts of 
insurance, or under any program or activity that is administered by an Executive 
Agency or any entity established under this title (or amendments).”). 
17. Id. at § 1302(b)(4)(C) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(C)). 
18. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (overturning Bowers v. Hardwick 
and finding a due process violation where a statute prohibited same-sex sexual 
acts because “[t]he Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can 
justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual”); Planned 
Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 896 (1992) (striking down 
requirement that women seeking abortions certify that they have notified the 
father of the fetus prior to obtaining an abortion because of the “far greater 
impact on the mother’s liberty than on the father’s” and noting that “the State 
has touched not only upon the private sphere of the family but upon the very 
bodily integrity of the pregnant woman”); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163 (1973) 
(striking down under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment a 
statute criminalizing abortion but noting that the State’s interests in regulating 
abortion becomes “compelling” at viability); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 
(1972) (striking down Massachusetts ban on the distribution of contraceptives to 
unmarried individuals under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment because “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the 
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion 
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slippery slope to test this right in the face of new technologies that permit 
or will soon permit would-be parents to select offspring with desired traits 
and even manipulate the DNA of embryos to design their own children.19 If 
couples can use PGD to avoid passing certain genes on to their children,20 a 
so-called “procreative liberty” may allow parents to use PGD to choose their 
children’s sex, physical appearance, or even sexual orientation simply as a 
matter of preference.21 John Robertson argues that income disparities, 
which make this new technology inaccessible to some, should not interfere 
with the right of others to procreate using these methods.22 As he has made 
clear for decades in his research and states in Children of Choice: Freedom 
and the New Reproductive Technologies: 
One can decry the disparities that exist and urge that society correct 
distributive inequities, however, without denying all persons the right to 
make these choices. In the end, the need for social justice is not a 
compelling reason for limiting the procreative choice of those who can 
pay.23 
Over the years, scholars including Dorothy Roberts and Radhika Rao 
have pushed to bring equality forward in the debate about ARTs.24 Some 
 
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear 
or beget a child”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965) (citing the 
constitutional “zone of privacy” surrounding the marital relationship when 
refusing to enforce a statute prohibiting the use of contraceptives). 
19. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty in the Era of Genomics, 29 AM. J.L. & MED. 
439, 442 (2003) [hereinafter Robertson I] (“A central dilemma is that accepting 
any instance of genetic selection in principle implies accepting most other 
instances of selection as well. But some uses seem much more questionable and 
less beneficial than the one initially accepted. Can acceptable lines be drawn, or is 
it better, as some would argue, to permit little, if any, genetic selection to 
occur?”). 
20. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHOICE: FREEDOM AND THE NEW REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 162 (1994) [hereinafter Robertson II] (“Assuming safety and efficacy, 
the main objections to therapeutic interventions on embryos are effects on the 
gene pool and later generations and slippery slope fears that it will lead to more 
dangerous interventions. However, neither harm is sufficiently weighty to deny 
parents this path to healthy offspring.”). 
21. See id. at 4 (“To deny procreative choice is to deny or impose a crucial self-defining 
experience, thus denying persons respect and dignity at the most basic level.”). 
22. Id. at 225-26 (“Yet it does not follow that society’s failure to assure access to 
reproductive technologies for all who would benefit justifies denying access to 
those who have the means to pay. Such a principle has not been followed with 
other medical procedures, even life-saving procedures such as heart transplants. 
As troubled as we might be by differential access, the demands of equality should 
not bar access for those fortunate enough to have the means.”). 
23. Id. at 227 (“It is another example of the disparities that differential distribution of 
wealth in a liberal society inevitably bring.”). 
24. See MAXWELL J. MEHLMAN & JEFFREY R. BOTKIN, ACCESS TO THE GENOME: THE CHALLENGE TO 
EQUALITY (1998); Rao, supra note 13; Roberts I, supra note 1, at 939. 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Reproductive Selection Bias 
272 
have moved for an emphasis on equality in place of liberty,25 while others 
have asserted that these constitutional rights are not binary and instead 
liberty requires equal access to ARTs.26 In this Section, I argue that 
procreative liberty requires equal access and, therefore, a positive right to 
funding for therapeutic PGD where children will otherwise have a reduced 
life expectancy or significantly impaired quality of life as a result of genetic 
illness or chromosome abnormality.27 I discuss the implications of this 
argument on the liberty and equality rights of the disabled. It is the addition 
of the child’s liberty to be free of preventable illness to the mother’s 
reproductive liberty to procreate in the manner she chooses that results in 
a positive right to funding for therapeutic PGD, despite a worrisome impact 
on the lives of the disabled. 
A.  The Tension Between Liberty and Equality 
The introduction of PGD in the 1980s was a dramatic advance in 
reproductive medicine and the study of genetics, since physicians could 
analyze the genetic makeup of embryos and make decisions about which 
embryos to implant into a woman seeking to become pregnant.28 One main 
benefit is that, in many cases, a woman no longer needs to conduct tests to 
determine the embryo’s health after implantation and possibly abort that 
fetus.29 
The PGD procedure begins with the couple undergoing IVF. The IVF 
process requires multiple steps: (1) medical suppression of the woman’s 
menstrual cycle, (2) medical stimulation of the woman’s ovaries to produce 
multiple eggs, (3) retrieval of the eggs, (4) collection of sperm from the man, 
and (5) combination of the sperm and eggs in the laboratory.30 After these 
 
25. See, e.g., Roberts I, supra note 1, at 939; Roberts II, supra note 9. 
26. See, e.g., Jessica Knouse, Reconciling Liberty and Equality in the Debate over 
Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 2013 UTAH L. REV. 107; Rao, supra note 13. 
27. Beyond questions of liberty and equality, scholars express concerns that 
nontherapeutic PGD gives parents too much control over their children and may 
harm them through expectations. Selecting embryos is a “highly instrumental 
approach to reproduction [that] . . . could lead to viewing children as 
commodities, and undermine their inherent worth and dignity.” John A. 
Robertson, Genetic Selection of Offspring Characteristics, 76 B.U. L. REV. 421, 423 
(1996) [hereinafter Robertson III]. 
28. Daar I, supra note 8, at 247-48 (“Perhaps the most important development in 
reproductive medicine since the introduction of IVF is a technique known as 
preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD).”). 
29. Id. at 248 (“The ability to select genetically healthy embryos for transfer into a 
woman’s uterus may reduce the number of elective abortions performed, but the 
use of PGD has not reduced the controversy that swirls around the medicalization 
of early life.” (footnotes omitted)). 
30. Embryo Screening Procedures, PENN MED., https://www.pennmedicine.org/for-
patients-and-visitors/find-a-program-or-service/penn-fertility-care/embryo-
screening/treatments-and-procedures (last visited Apr. 1, 2017). 
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steps are completed and the eggs and sperm have combined to produce 
embryos, the PGD process begins. 
Once the embryo has been cultivated in the laboratory for three days, 
an embryo biopsy is performed.31 At this stage, “[t]he embryos are typically 
eight-cell embryos . . . and the process involves the removal of one to two 
cells.”32 The biopsied cells are then analyzed using one of two techniques, 
depending on what the couple is interested in testing for—heritable genetic 
disorders or chromosomal abnormalities.33 Once the results are received, 
the “embryo(s) of the best quality that are not affected by the genetic 
disorder or chromosomal abnormality) [sic] are selected for transfer to the 
uterus . . . following two additional days of culture in the laboratory.”34 
Alternatively, the biopsy of the embryo can be completed after either 
five or six days of cultivation, at which point “the embryo consists of many 
cells and . . . [c]ells are removed from the outer layer of cells.”35 After 
biopsy, all of the embryos with no chromosome abnormalities that are still 
viable for implantation are frozen.36 The same tests are performed on the 
biopsied cells. Once the results come in, “non-affected or chromosomally 
normal [embryos] are thawed and transferred” to the uterus.37 
For both biopsy techniques, if, after the transfer of certain embryos to 
the uterus, “additional unaffected and good-quality embryos are available, 
they may be cryopreserved for future embryo transfer.”38 Those embryos 
that are affected or that present chromosomal abnormalities are either 
discarded or donated for use in scientific research.39 As of 2014, PGD was 
 
31. Id. 
32. Id. 
33. Id. (explaining that during these tests the biopsied cells are destroyed “and can’t 
be used for another purpose or returned to the embryo.”). 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. See Kathryn Ehrich et al., The Embryo as Moral Work Object: PGD/IVF Staff Views 
and Experiences, 30 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 772 (2008). 
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utilized in approximately 19,000 IVF cycles.40 Of those, PGD for 
nontherapeutic purposes was used in approximately 1700 cycles.41 
Currently, PGD can be used for medical selection (to discard embryos 
with chromosomal abnormalities or genetic mutations that increase the 
likelihood of a disease in favor of healthy embryos) and sex selection 
(sometimes used to discard embryos with a sex-linked genetic disease but 
more often to select sex based on parental preference). While trait 
selection (selection based on the embryo’s physical traits, such as height, 
eye color, or intelligence) is not yet possible, it dominates the academic 
debates over the wisdom and ethics of using PGD to select embryos.42 
In addition to helping parents create healthier babies without genes for 
inherited diseases, PGD may soon allow parents to choose which embryos 
to implant based on the embryo’s “eye color, hair color, skin color, sex, and 
even ‘disabilities.’”43 In the United States, there is little regulation of such 
nontherapeutic applications of PGD.44 There are few measures of the 
demand for nontherapeutic use of PGD (which likely exceeds current 
technology), although historical demand for favored traits can be shown 
through favoritism for male children and a preference for children with 
certain physical traits.45 
 
40. National Summary Report, SOC’Y ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., 
https://www.sartcorsonline.com/rptCSR_PublicMultYear.aspx?ClinicPKID=0 
(follow “FILTER” in upper-right-hand corner, select “INCLUDE ONLY” for “PGD/PGS”) 
(last visited Apr. 1, 2017). What Is SART?, SOC’Y ASSISTED REPROD. TECH., 
http://www.sart.org/patients/what-is-sart/ (last visited Apr. 1, 2017) (noting that 
in recent years the Society for Assisted Reproductive Technology (“SART”) has 
collected information from its members regarding IVF cycles and the outcomes of 
those cycles; SART consists of 90% of ART clinics in the United States). 
41. See Harvey J. Stern, Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis: Prenatal Testing for 
Embryos Finally Achieving Its Potential, 3 J. CLINICAL MED. 280, 284 (2014) (“Of all 
PGD cycles reported in 2005, non-medical sex selection was performed in 9% of 
cases.” (footnote omitted)). This number was reached by utilizing the 9% figure 
posited by Harvey Stern, and multiplying that number by the SART number of IVF 
procedures that utilized PGD. 
42. Daar I, supra note 8, at 250-51. 
43. See Knouse, supra note 26, at 109 (citation omitted). 
44. Id. at 109, 121 (“Although it is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately categorize 
the various tests, some are considered therapeutic while others are considered 
nontherapeutic. Therapeutic tests are commonly used to detect single gene 
disorders such as cystic fibrosis, Tay-Sachs, and sickle cell anemia, as well as 
chromosomal abnormalities such as Down syndrome and Turner syndrome.” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
45. Id. at 118-20 (“Throughout history, at least some prospective parents have 
wanted to select the attributes of their prospective children--sometimes out of a 
desire to maximize their social status and opportunity and sometimes out of a 
desire to reproduce themselves. Some prospective parents in patriarchal societies 
have wanted male children; some in racially stratified societies have wanted 
blond-haired, blue-eyed, light-skinned children . . . . While prospective parents 
have always been able to make general choices about their children’s attributes 
through ‘eugenic dating’ (and, since the 1960s, through the use of donor 
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It is easy to imagine what complications could arise if parents begin to 
implant only male embryos in large numbers, for example.46 Not only would 
a stigma eventually develop against female children, but there could be 
long-term consequences for marriage and birth rates reminiscent of 
problems resulting from China’s one-child policy and the use of less-
advanced methods to select male children.47 Similarly, selecting embryos 
based on hair color and eye color would inevitably stigmatize the less-
favored characteristics, particularly as their incidence in the population 
declined. 
The literature debating the wisdom of regulating nontherapeutic uses 
of PGD—and ARTs more generally—addresses the supposed conflict 
between the liberty right of parents to be free from government intrusion 
into procreation and childbearing and the issue of equality, since not 
everyone has access to this procedure, but focuses largely on the 
importance of valuing liberty over equality.48 
 
material), they could not, until the 1970s, make specific choices about their 
children’s attributes.” (footnotes omitted)). 
46. I note here, however, that selecting embryos for sex can be therapeutic because 
some genetic diseases are either only present in one sex or are more prevalent 
among people of that sex. See id. at 121 (“Testing for sex has therapeutic 
relevance in that it can prevent X-linked diseases such as hemophilia, as well as 
nontherapeutic (social) relevance for prospective parents who want a child of a 
given sex.” (footnotes omitted)). 
47. But see Daar I, supra note 8, at 265-71 (arguing against banning PGD to select sex 
of embryos because it restricts reproductive freedom “in the name of preventing 
an uncertain harm to others”). 
48. See Knouse, supra note 26, at 109-10. Some professors argue that the Due Process 
Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments protect the use of PGD for 
nontherapeutic reasons. The theory underlying all of the reproductive rights 
cases, see supra note 16, is that an individual has a right to decide whether to bear 
or beget a child. Based on this theory, PGD would seem to be protected as an 
integral part of that right. This is true whether an individual is using PGD to decide 
whether to have a child with a disability or not or whether to have a child with a 
certain eye color or not. Additionally, given how early PGD occurs in the 
pregnancy, the government’s compelling interest in the potentiality of human life 
would seem to be very low (failing the undue burden standard utilized in abortion 
cases such as Casey). The difference between non-therapeutic and therapeutic 
seems more relevant when looking at the undue burden standard, however. 
Forcing an individual to decide between having a child with a disability or not 
having a biological child would likely be considered an undue burden on a person’s 
right to bear or beget a child. It would also be hard to argue that therapeutic PGD 
is not protected because the procedure is focused on the health of the potential 
human life. The reason the government has any power to restrict the right to 
abortion is that it has a compelling interest in the health of the mother or the 
potentiality of human life. On the other hand, forcing an individual to decide 
between having a child with a certain eye color or not having a biological child 
likely would not be viewed as an undue burden. Finally, the Court has held in 
Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124 (2007), that completely restricting access to a 
certain type of abortion is not unconstitutional as long as there is another 
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Robertson defines procreative liberty as “the freedom to decide 
whether or not to have offspring.”49 According to Robertson, this “deeply 
held moral and legal value” mandates that the government will almost 
never have sufficient reason for limiting use of reproductive technology.50 
This “negative right” is “first and foremost an individual interest,” and does 
not imply a duty to fund those who cannot afford to exercise this liberty.51 
Robertson believes that procreative liberty should prevent government 
regulation of nontherapeutic PGD, although he terms the use of embryo 
selection “quality control.”52 He asserts that the tie between offspring’s 
traits and the decision to reproduce, which is protected by the courts, 
argues in favor of a procreative liberty that encompasses genetic selection 
and even genetic alteration of embryos where the ability to determine the 
offspring’s traits affects the decision to reproduce or not to reproduce.53 
Although Robertson concedes that wealth disparities that prevent 
uniform access to technologies such as PGD are troubling, his focus is on 
the importance of parents’ liberty to decide when and how to procreate.54 
As he says, this healthcare problem applies more broadly than in 
reproduction—”the rich get the benefits, the poor get a few crumbs or 
 
procedure that can be used. It would seem then that the Court might allow 
nontherapeutic PGD to be banned without banning therapeutic PGD. 
49. Robertson II, supra note 20, at 3-4. 
50. Id. at 4, 16 (“I propose that procreative liberty be given presumptive priority in all 
conflicts, with the burden on opponents of any particular technique to show that 
harmful effects from its use justify limiting procreative choice.”). 
51. Id. at 22-23 (“The exercise of procreative liberty may be severely constrained by 
social and economic circumstances. Access to medical care, child care, 
employment, housing, and other services may significantly affect whether one is 
able to exercise procreative liberty. However, the state presently has no 
constitutional obligation to provide those services. Whether the state should 
alleviate those conditions is a separate issue of social justice.”). But see Cass R. 
Sunstein, Lochner’s Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 873, 889 (1987) (“Viewed through 
the lens of the Lochner period, claims for ‘positive rights’ cannot be dismissed by 
reference to the ‘negative’ character of constitutional guarantees or the word 
‘deprive’ in the in the fourteenth amendment. Whether there is a deprivation 
depends on antecedent conceptions of entitlement; if there were a pre-existing 
right to welfare, the failure to provide it would in fact be a deprivation.”). 
52. Robertson II, supra note 20, at 150-51 (“The term ‘quality control’ sounds 
perjorative [sic], but it is the parents’ interest in healthy offspring that has spurred 
these developments.”). 
53. Robertson III, supra note 27, at 425-27 (“Because reproductive events have such 
personal significance and impact, the decision whether or not to reproduce should 
clearly be within an individual’s personal discretion.” (footnote omitted)). 
Unsurprisingly based on his argument, Robertson includes within this category of 
procreative liberty, the use of ART to prevent passing on late-onset genetic 
diseases such as Huntington’s disease, polycystic kidney disease, and Alzheimer’s 
disease, as well as genes that make offspring more likely to inherit diseases such 
as cancer, heart disease, and even bipolar disorder. Id. at 433. 
54. Robertson II, supra note 20, at 14. 
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nothing”55—but he does not believe that issues of wealth inequality should 
interfere with access to ARTs for those who can afford them.56 While many 
scholars have critiqued his theory of procreative liberty in the decades since 
he developed it,57 fewer scholars have focused on addressing his admission 
that “[a]llocating reproductive technologies and other essential goods and 
services according to ability to pay raises profound questions of social 
justice.”58 
For an individual to access the technologies, (1) there must be a 
sufficient supply to meet the demand, (2) that individual must have the 
funds to pay for the services, and (3) the person must know about the 
technologies and “know to ask for them.”59 While many fear that this 
country’s history of eugenics will result in the use of ARTs to “fix” the gene 
pool by pushing for their use on the poor,60 equally troubling is the 
predominant use of the technologies by the wealthy to increase their 
already-existing social advantages by selecting offspring with desirable 
traits.61 Disability rights advocates and other scholars emphasize that the 
inability of many to afford technologies such as PGD could result in a genetic 
 
55. Id. 
56. Id. at 15 (“Discrimination by wealth, however, seems inevitable if reproductive 
technologies are to be available at all. While some persons would argue that 
access to reproductive technology should be a mandated benefit in any health 
insurance program, the high cost of universal health care for the uninsured makes 
it unlikely that most reproductive technologies will be covered. Other than 
contraception, abortion, and some prenatal screening, it is likely that access to 
most reproductive technologies will remain dependent on wealth.”). 
57. See, e.g., Gilbert Meilaender, Products of the Will: Robertson’s Children of Choice, 
52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 173 (1995); Laura M. Purdy, Children of Choice: Whose 
Children? At What Cost?, 52 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 197, 198 (1995) (asserting that 
most feminists “will also be critical of the individualistic stream that runs through 
his work, as it favors those with more power and disadvantages those who, like 
white women and people of color, tend to have less”). 
58. Robertson II, supra note 20, at 225-26 (“A major problem with a rights-based 
approach is that it ignores the social and economic context in which exercise of 
rights is embedded.”). 
59. MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 24, at 55. 
60. Id. at 61 (“Eugenics advocates who see genetic technologies as a way to ‘perfect’ 
the human gene pool might push for allocation policies that favor persons with 
relatively poor genetic endowments. These policies also might appeal to liberals 
as a means of rectifying gross disparities of social status by giving persons of low 
status access to genetic enhancements that promote upward social mobility.”). 
61. Id. (“[S]ome people may prefer to reserve scarce genetic resources for those who 
are gifted with superior genes, on the theory that they would make the best use 
of them, thereby yielding the greatest amount of social good.”). 
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arms race that will leave the poor and disabled farther behind.62 These fears 
lead to calls for regulation of ARTs.63 
The problem with relying on the public’s willingness to pay to allocate 
access to ARTs is that it assumes that individuals have roughly similar wealth 
and that goods should then be divided based on how strong consumer 
demand for a particular good is. But wealth disparities undermine this 
analysis.64 It looks like an even worse way to allocate access to genetic 
selection technologies when one factors in that some have a greater need 
for access to those services, such as a family history of a grave, genetic 
illness.65 
Scholars who have focused on equality in reproductive rights fear that 
creating a positive right to ARTs will result in government coercion and a 
lack of meaningful choice due to pressure to use the technology.66 Several 
scholars have therefore proposed limiting the use of ARTs to ensure 
equality, instead of expanding access. Radhika Rao discusses the “intimate 
relationship between liberty and equality [that] suggests that courts should 
strive to ensure equal liberty: limits upon individual liberty and autonomy 
should be meted out with a measure of equality.”67 She puts forth a theory 
 
62. Rao, supra note 13, at 1467-68. 
63. Id. at 1474 (“Hence, all persons must possess an equal right, even if no one retains 
an absolute right, to use ARTs.”). Many argue that ARTs aggravate inequality by 
focusing on the female role to reproduce and by emphasizing genetics to advance 
racist, sexist, and classist prejudices. 
64. MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 24, at 89 (“But willingness to pay runs into a 
fundamental problem. It might be a satisfactory and perhaps even superior way 
of allocating access to genetic technologies so long as individuals are able to afford 
the technologies they desire. Part of what economists who advocate willingness-
to-pay approaches mean when they assume that ‘all other things are equal’ is that 
everyone has roughly the same amount of wealth. But . . . as we know from 
personal experience, this clearly is not the case.”). 
65. Id. (“Another assumption that economists make is that everyone has the same 
basic needs for the desired goods, for example, the same risk factors that cause 
them to need genetic technologies. But this assumption is false . . . . As Richard 
Epstein . . . points out, ability to pay does not correlate well with medical need.”). 
66. See, e.g., Roberts I, supra note 1, at 947-49 (discussing the impact that law and 
social structures have had on black reproduction and stating that social justice 
may require that government “reallocate resources away from expensive 
reproductive technologies”). 
67. Rao, supra note 13, at 1488. The same privacy cases that those favoring 
reproductive liberty cite to prevent government interference with the right to 
procreate or not to procreate can be viewed as advocating for equality since they 
helped women control their reproductive years, their ability to work, and their 
bodies. Indeed, the cases that are the foundation of a constitutional right to 
privacy overturn laws that distinguish between different races and classes. Id. at 
1466-67 (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma – striking down law permitting sterilization of 
chicken thieves but not embezzlers, Meyer v. Nebraska – striking down law 
prohibiting foreign language instruction in schools, Pierce v. Society of Sisters – 
striking down law requiring public school attendance, Loving v. Virginia – striking 
down law banning interracial marriage, Zablocki v. Redhail – striking down law 
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of equal liberty, or reproductive liberty, that permits the government to 
prohibit or limit different ARTs but does not allow distinctions “based upon 
the status of the persons involved.”68 Only laws that allow all to use ARTs, 
including sexual minorities and the unmarried for example, would be 
constitutional.69 Banning therapeutic or nontherapeutic PGD is 
constitutional under Rao’s framework.70 
Dorothy Roberts more strongly advocates limiting the use of ARTs. The 
correlation between race and socioeconomic status means that race plays 
a large role in any discussion of equality in the use of ARTs. Even the 
supposedly noble goal of therapeutic PGD must still contend with the 
notion that many of the poor (more likely to be minorities) do not place the 
same value on genetic ties and should not be coerced into using ARTs when 
other options, such as not having children, using sperm donors, or adopting 
children, are available. As Roberts writes, “I have also noticed that America 
is obsessed with creating and preserving white genetic ties. Trading the 
genetic tie on the market lays bare the high value placed on whiteness and 
the worthlessness accorded blackness.”71 Given the high price of racial 
discrimination in the United States, the potential for parents to manipulate 
genes to alter the race of embryos is not speculative. Roberts questions 
whether limiting the use of ARTs sacrifices too much liberty on the altar of 
equality, but in the end, believes that imposing such limits is the best 
solution to issues of modern reproduction and inequality.72 
Other solutions scholars propose focus on equality, including using the 
money that is saved by avoiding genetic diseases to fund increased ART 
 
requiring court approval prior to marriage for any individual with an outstanding 
child support obligation, and Lawrence v. Texas – striking down law prohibiting 
same-sex sodomy). 
68. Id. at 1460 (“Why provide equal but not absolute rights in the realm of assisted 
reproduction? The principle of reproductive liberty has no logical stopping point; 
it confers constitutional protection upon almost every technology that is 
necessary to procreation . . . . It subjects all laws that restrict reproductive 
autonomy to strict judicial scrutiny and requires them to be struck down unless 
necessary to advance compelling governmental objectives.” (footnotes omitted)); 
cf. Andrew B. Coan, Assisted Reproductive Equality: An Institutional Analysis, 60 
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1143 (2010) (calling for additional comparative institutional 
analysis of Rao’s proposal). 
69. Rao, supra note 13, at 1460. 
70. Id. at 1482. 
71. Roberts II, supra note 9, at 210-11 (arguing that the genetic tie is not based on 
biology but instead a method “that promotes racist and patriarchal norms”). 
Roberts finds that the most socially significant genetic link between parents and 
child is race. Id. at 223. 
72. Roberts I, supra note 1, at 948-49. Roberts supports equal access to ARTs through 
government subsidies and legislation requiring their inclusion in private insurance 
coverage, although she believes the use of ARTs ultimately should be restricted. 
Id. at 946-47. 
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use,73 mandating insurance coverage for technology use,74 providing 
assistance to those with greater needs for the technology through charity,75 
and even using genetic lotteries.76 Most proposed solutions focus on 
therapeutic PGD and not nontherapeutic PGD.77 Jessica Knouse, however, 
proposes subsidizing nontherapeutic PGD as one solution that promotes 
both liberty and equality.78 Given the demand for services that would likely 
result if subsidies for nontherapeutic PGD were large enough to rectify 
equality concerns, however, this proposal would be a very costly one. 
B. Liberty for the Disabled 
Any proposal to fund PGD use to screen out genetic illness or 
chromosomal abnormalities impacts the disabled. Many of those with 
disabilities view themselves as subject to an unfair social stigma rather than 
burdened by their disabilities.79 Efforts to deselect embryos for disabilities 
can be seen as a failure to understand the value of the lives of the disabled. 
 
73. MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 24, at 105-06 (“The problem is that, surprising as it 
may sound, it simply is not clear that preventing illness saves money. No doubt it 
may reduce the costs of acute care in the short run, but in the long run, the people 
who would have died from acute ailments would go on to live longer and to 
contract the expensive, chronic illnesses of old age.”). This point, however, 
excludes the many additional years of insurance premium payments that 
companies would collect along the way. 
74. Id. at 107 (“The only technologies that might be excluded from coverage due to 
cost would be those that were expected to yield only trivial benefits . . . . 
However, this assumes that we could define which benefits were trivial.”). 
75. Id. at 111 (“If organized charities stepped in to finance access to genetic 
technologies, they might well allocate their funds on the basis of judgments about 
the recipients’ character, or their social worth, or on the basis of their religion or 
ethnicity, all of which might raise complaints of favoritism and unfairness that 
could lead to government intervention.”). 
76. See id. at ch. 7. 
77. But see JUDITH DAAR, THE NEW EUGENICS: SELECTIVE BREEDING IN AN ERA OF REPRODUCTIVE 
TECHNOLOGIES 193-95 (2017) [hereinafter Daar II] (calling for broad increases in 
insurance coverage, “reduced-cost treatment strategies”, and additional 
charitable provision for ART to make it more accessible to those who cannot afford 
it). 
78. Knouse, supra note 26, at 152 (“This is not to say that subsidies are unequivocally 
the best policy, simply that they appear most likely to enable the expression of 
genetic and ideological diversity. If future studies revealed that this was not 
accurate--because prospective parents were, for example, consistently selecting 
against given eye, hair, and skin colors, or against a given sex--reassessment would 
of course be required.”). 
79. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, Disability, Life, Death, and Choice, 29 HARV. J. L. & GENDER 
425, 435-36 (2006) [hereinafter Bagenstos I] (noting that many disability rights 
advocates view the “greatest suffering of people with disabilities [as] the socially 
stigmatized identity inflicted upon them” and argue that the solution is not to 
treat or eliminate disabilities but instead to eliminate the stigma and stop 
devaluing disabled lives (internal footnotes omitted)). 
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In addition, funding for therapeutic PGD may create pressure to deselect 
embryos because doing so is what the government and society believe is 
right. As the number of disabled people decreases, the social stigma of 
being different is likely to increase. While the amount of resources spent to 
aid the disabled may not necessarily decrease, the community will be 
smaller, and views of the disabled will be different, because of efforts to 
screen out genetic illness and resulting disabilities. 
Although I discuss these implications of my argument below in Section 
III, here I address the main focus of the health law literature in addressing 
liberty for the disabled—the small percentage of parents who seek to use 
PGD to produce children with traits that many consider to be disabilities, 
such as deafness or dwarfism. The fact that this is the topic that dominates 
discussions of reproductive rights with ARTs and the disabled shows the 
extent to which liberty still dominates equality in the literature on ARTs and 
also the implications for the disabled of any positive right to PGD. Some 
disabled parents want to bring children into a culture that is an integral part 
of their lives,80 but health law scholars have been largely critical and coined 
the phrase “intentional diminishment.”81 
My focus here is on how the ability to eliminate disabilities through 
methods such as therapeutic PGD creates an “in” group and “out” group. 
Given that the “out” group already struggles with feeling different and 
isolated, further use of ARTs by wealthy whites will only enhance the idea 
of two genetic classes: those with healthy or better genes and those 
without, the healthy babies and the sick babies. 
Under Robertson’s procreative liberty framework, the decision to 
reproduce could be fundamentally affected by whether a couple can have 
a child who is deaf or has a form of dwarfism, leading to the conclusion that 
PGD to intentionally produce a child with a disability should be permitted 
under the law. Here, however, the liberty runs up against a demonstration 
of “tangible harm to others [that] would justify restriction.”82 Families who 
 
80. See Darshak M. Sanghavi, Wanting Babies Like Themselves, Some Parents Choose 
Genetic Defects, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2006), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/05/health/05essa.html?_r=0 (“Traditionally, 
cultures were perpetuated through assortative mating, with intermarriage among 
the like-minded and the like-appearing. Modern technology has been adopted for 
this purpose . . . .”). 
81. See I. Glenn Cohen, Intentional Diminishment, the Non-Identity Problem, and Legal 
Liability, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 347, 349 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen I] (“While Smolensky 
discusses creating ‘children with disabilities,’ I will from here on out use the phrase 
‘intentional diminishment,’ which I will define as intentionally using reproductive 
technology to produce a child who is on balance significantly harmed as compared 
to the ‘normal’ child (think of ‘diminishment’ as the antonymic concept to 
‘enhancement,’ which is often discussed in the bioethics literature).”). 
82. Robertson III, supra note 28, at 439. Robertson believes that ignoring genetic test 
results (whether the testing is mandatory or voluntary) and producing 
“unavoidably handicapped offspring” does not harm the children because there is 
no other outcome possible. Robertson says there is “in most cases no wrongful 
life.” He continues, “As long as persons who choose to ignore genetic information 
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believe that being a member of the deaf community, for example, is 
beneficial to a child would dispute the notion that being deaf is harmful to 
a child or argue that this harm is balanced by the benefits of participation 
in a vibrant and cohesive community. Scholars have largely opposed the use 
of PGD and other ARTs to produce disabled children, however.83 
The health law literature’s focus on the use of ARTs to affirmatively 
produce children with disabilities is a response to claims that reproductive 
technology will result in a modern form of eugenics and a desire by some 
to prevent forced genetic selection. From the late 1880s to the early 
twentieth century, the eugenics movement in the United States asserted 
that selective breeding could improve society by eliminating bad genes. 
One result was that over 60,000 supposed undesirables, including the 
mentally ill, criminals, drug addicts, the blind, orphans, and the homeless 
were involuntarily sterilized.84 PGD raises concerns that it would either: 1) 
result in an “in” group of wealthy whites who deselect embryos with 
disabilities or select embryos with favored characteristics, stigmatizing 
those who cannot afford the technology or do not want to use it for other 
reasons or 2) force or coerce those with a gene that results in disabled 
offspring to deselect embryos with the gene, regardless of their preference, 
if the law mandates such a policy.85 Because the second possibility is most 
 
in reproducing are able and willing to rear affected offspring, the costs of their 
reproduction are unlikely to be sufficient to support a charge of reproductive 
irresponsibility. Public action to prevent the birth of genetically handicapped 
offspring by mandatory means is thus not justified.” Robertson II, supra note 20, 
at 152. 
83. Scholars have even speculated whether children born with a disability that was 
intentionally selected by the parents using PGD could sue their parents under tort 
law. See Kirsten Rabe Smolensky, Creating Children with Disabilities: Parental Tort 
Liability for Preimplantation Genetic Interventions, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 299, 344 (2008) 
(arguing that parents who use PGD to select embryos with disabilities – as 
opposed to parents who may in the future be able to edit the DNA of embryos to 
intentionally diminish children – cannot be sued because they “do not create a 
legally cognizable injury to the born-alive child because of the Non-Identity 
Problem” which dictates that there is no harm because the child would not 
otherwise exist). But see Cohen I, supra note 81 (evaluating Smolensky’s 
arguments and taking issue with her attempt to distinguish manipulation from 
selection and to argue that the Non-Identity Problem prevents liability in the case 
of PGD). 
84. Daar I, supra note 8, at 260-61. 
85. “As genetic screening increasingly enables individuals to manage their own health 
by reducing genetic risk, we may see its wider incorporation into the health care 
system. Using reprogenetics to select the traits of children may become more of 
a general duty than a privileged choice. Widespread prenatal testing has already 
assigned pregnant women primary responsibility for making the ‘right’ genetic 
decisions.” DOROTHY ROBERTS, FATAL INVENTION: HOW SCIENCE, POLITICS, AND BIG BUSINESS 
RE-CREATE RACE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 217 (2011) [hereinafter Roberts III]. “[I]n 
her book exploring the public consequences of private decisions about 
reproductive technologies, Lynda Beck Fenwick suggests readers ask themselves, 
‘Are you willing to pay higher taxes to cover costs of government benefits for 
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similar to the American history of eugenics—and thus more likely to 
provoke great backlash and protest—scholars have focused on the first, 
more invidious possibility. 
Robertson argues that choosing not to have disabled children does not 
inherently harm those who are currently disabled. As he states, “A policy to 
prevent accidents that cause paraplegia does not harm existing paraplegics, 
nor prevent us from supporting programs that make their lives easier.”86 
Robertson misses the point, however, that as the number of people who 
are disabled declines, it is likely that supportive policies will decline, 
particularly as the wealthy opt out of disabilities. If the wealthy can avoid 
having disabilities, they are less likely to lobby for government funding for 
the disabled or to contribute to charities that support the disabled. 
If PGD can be used to screen out disabilities, it will inevitably stigmatize 
individuals living with disabilities. As Robertson states: 
Persons or families with disabled children have claimed that a policy 
that encourages prebirth genetic deselection of persons with 
disabilities is a public statement that the lives of the disabled are 
worth less than those of the able-bodied. In addition, such a policy 
reduces the number of persons with those disabilities, thus reducing 
their political effectiveness . . . . In short, it engenders or reinforces 
public perceptions that the disabled should not exist, making 
intolerance and discrimination toward them more likely.87 
This is one plausible argument for either rejecting any expansion of the 
use of PGD or allowing those who have genetic disabilities to perpetuate 
their community through procreation, particularly given the United States’ 
murky past. 
 
babies born with genetic defects, even when the parents knew of the high 
likelihood or certainty such defects would occur.’ This question suggests that the 
main objective of a state-supported reprogenetics program would not be to give 
individuals more reproductive choices but to escape public responsibility for 
disability-related needs . . . . In the future, the government may rely on the 
expectation that all pregnant women will undergo genetic testing to justify not 
only its refusal to support the care of disabled children, but also its denial of 
broader claims for the public provision of health care. Without a right to basic 
health care, more widespread use of genetic technologies could come at the 
expense of public health.” Id. at 221. 
86. Robertson III, supra note 27, at 453. 
87. Id. at 453 (footnote omitted). Rao says “it should be (a) relatively easy for the state 
to make the case for allowing PGD to select against a serious disease that would 
cause death, (b) more difficult but still possible to justify PGD to select against a 
‘disability’ that arguably decreases quality of life, such as deafness, but (c) much 
more difficult, and perhaps impossible, to defend PGD to select for traits such as 
sex, skin color, and sexual orientation that are disfavored solely because of 
negative societal attitudes and prejudice.” Rao, supra note 13, at 1484 (footnotes 
omitted). 
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Judith Daar, however, argues against the idea that therapeutic PGD will 
lead to a slippery slope back to eugenics. First, selective abortions serving 
the same purpose have been and are available, but do not produce the 
same fears. Second, although there are fears that parents will look to 
produce the perfect child, everyone’s definition of perfect is different, as 
shown by the parents who are willing to go to great lengths to have a child 
who is deaf or has dwarfism.88 I would add, though, that the parents who 
seek to produce children with disabilities are, in part, reacting to a culture 
of inequality; rather than defining their perfect child, they seek to defend 
those considered diminished by growing their numbers. 
Who defines what genes are good and bad? The answer is less obvious 
outside of the example of genetic illness. Ensuring greater access to ARTs 
results in a larger, more diverse population deciding which genes are 
desirable and defending their communities.89 In Section II, I look at how 
recent disputes relating to PGD already have a negative impact on the 
disabled and show that not enough attention has been paid to the creation 
of a bifurcated system of procreation. 
II. PGD and the Courts 
The most pressing questions before courts related to PGD are who 
determines when and whether the embryos are implanted and what 
happens when the wrong embryo is implanted (and, of course, what 
constitutes the wrong embryo). Where courts once hesitated to consider 
death an injury that resulted in a valid legal claim, the now-accepted 
wrongful death claim has given way to attempts to gain recognition for a 
wrongful life tort.90 
A significant amount of scholarship has addressed the growing demand 
for recognition of wrongful life as a tort.91 Much has been made about the 
 
88. Daar I, supra note 8, at 262-64 (“If our society is interested in preventing 
intentional diminishment by birth parents, any regulatory scheme must be 
directed at all prospective violators, not just those who require assistance to 
procreate.”). 
89. See Roberts III, supra note 85, at 220 (“Although government welfare systems 
have disdained facilitating childbearing by poor women of color by declining to 
fund fertility treatments, they may treat prenatal genetic testing quite differently. 
The very same thinking that promotes laws and policies that pressure these 
women to have fewer children could promote laws and policies that pressure 
them to have genetically screened children.”). 
90. Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 808 (1978) (“Although no longer shackled by 
the conceptual difficulties formerly posed by a ‘wrongful death’ action, courts 
have again been drawn toward the murky waters at the periphery of existing legal 
theory to test the validity of a cause of action for what has been generically 
termed ‘wrongful life.’”). 
91. See, e.g., Dov Fox, Reproductive Negligence, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 241 (2017) 
(advocating for a new cause of action to address “reproductive injuries”); Wendy 
F. Hensel, The Disabling Impact of Wrongful Birth and Wrongful Life Actions, 40 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 141, 143-45 (2005) (acknowledging the existence of scholarly 
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comparison between living a life with a disease or other genetic 
abnormality and living a healthy life (or living no life at all if the comparator 
is never having been born).92 What scholars have not addressed is how 
disputes over implanting the wrong embryos and increasing this tort’s 
recognition would affect children born with the same genetic abnormalities 
who were not conceived through ARTs. If something goes awry in the PGD 
process and a child can recover because the wrong embryo was implanted, 
this creates a stigma for those born with preventable diseases or conditions 
whose parents either did not know about PGD or could not afford to utilize 
it.93 The children conceived through PGD could also recover the medical and 
long-term care costs associated with the condition, even though they are 
more likely to be the children of those who can afford to bear such costs. 
The resolution of custody disputes relating to frozen embryos further 
serves to stigmatize those without access to therapeutic PGD by 
emphasizing the exceptional importance of having a genetic child and 
creating the inference that the chance to have a healthy genetic child would 
merit even greater legal protection. When the last chance to have a genetic 
child can outweigh another person’s right not to be a parent, then the last 
chance to have a healthy genetic child is likely to trump that right as well.94 
Dov Fox recently proposed a framework for addressing “reproductive 
negligence” that recognizes that “[t]he harm is being robbed of the ability 
to determine the conditions under which to procreate.”95 Rejecting “a legal 
system that treats heedlessly switched sperm, lost embryos, and 
misdiagnosed fetuses not as misconduct that it protects against and 
compensates victims for, but as misfortune that it tolerates and forces them 
to abide,”96 Fox outlines a unified legal claim to address the distinct harms 
that negligence in assisted reproduction causes.97 His article never 
 
research supporting the recognition of the tort of wrongful life); Matthew 
Reisman, Note, Harm and the Fluid Nature of Identity in Wrongful Life Cases 
Involving Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis, 20 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 405, 407-09 
(2014) (arguing that the wrongful life tort fits within the existing jurisprudence 
regarding negligence torts). 
92. See, e.g., Hensel, supra note 91, at 161; Reisman, supra note 91, at 422; Alexander 
D. Wolfe, Wrongful Selection: Assisted Reproductive Technologies, Intentional 
Diminishment, and the Procreative Right, 25 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 475, 489 (2008). 
93. See, Hensel, supra note 91; Marley McClean, Note, Children’s Anatomy v. 
Children’s Autonomy: A Precarious Balancing Act with Preimplantation Genetic 
Diagnosis and the Creation of “Savior Siblings”, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 837, 865 (2016). 
94. See infra notes 121, 124-31, 133-41 and accompanying text. 
95. Fox, supra note 91, at 155. 
96. Id. 
97. It is worth noting that, as Fox acknowledges, his proposed legal framework will 
increase the cost of ARTs. He proposes an option such as damage caps “that 
balances the freedoms that reproductive treatment enables against the injuries 
that it can inflict.” Regardless, the additional liability will further reduce access 
without additional insurance or government subsidies. See id. at 214. 
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mentions the impact of this claim on those without access to the means to 
effectuate their reproductive rights. Should they have a claim because they 
have been “robbed of the ability to determine the conditions under which 
to procreate?”98 If not, any such legal right places those with access above 
those without, an exacerbation of the current legal framework that I review 
below. 
The courts have not protected the right of those who cannot afford to 
undergo therapeutic PGD to have similarly healthy genetic children. As 
courts increasingly protect the rights of parents and children to deselect 
embryos with unhealthy genes, access to reproductive rights should be a 
key component of the jurisprudence. 
A. Tort Law 
Approximately one in five IVF clinics “report errors in diagnosing, 
labeling, and ‘handling samples or embryos.’”99 As more people use 
therapeutic PGD, lawsuits that argue negligence in cases where children are 
born with a chromosome abnormality or a gene for a genetic disease in 
spite of efforts to only implant healthy embryos will increase. Prior to the 
development of PGD, these lawsuits focused on alleged negligence related 
to the genetic testing of fetuses. Some lawsuits included claims using a tort 
of wrongful birth and focused on the parents’ injury because they were 
unable to abort the fetus since the disability or illness was not diagnosed in 
utero.100 Wrongful life actions on the child’s behalf allege that the 
negligence “enabled the child to come into being, the operable injury is the 
child’s life itself, with non-existence identified as the preferred 
alternative.”101 Generally, courts have favored wrongful birth claims but not 
wrongful life claims, while scholars have typically defended both actions.102 
Courts identified two problems with recognizing a wrongful life cause 
of action—the lack of a legal injury, and the lack of a proper remedy to put 
the injured party in the same position he or she would have been in absent 
 
98. See id. at 177 (“[Reproductive decisions] vindicate not just decisional autonomy 
(how freely she chooses), but also individual well-being (how well such outcomes 
help her live).”). 
99. Id. at 152 (citation omitted). 
100. See, e.g., Becker v. Schwartz, 386 N.E.2d 807, 809-14 (1978) (rejecting wrongful 
birth claims in companion cases where plaintiffs, respectively, sued because 
Becker had a child with Down’s Syndrome after she was not advised by her doctor 
of the increased risk beyond age 35 or of the possibility of having an amniocentesis 
test and Park had a second child after her doctor incorrectly told her polycystic 
kidney disease is not hereditary); see also Fox, supra note 91, at 169 (“Wrongful-
birth actions fail to fully consider the separate and serious harm that victims of 
reproductive negligence suffer. Their complaint is not that the child they received 
is undesired or undesirable; it is that they have been denied the chance to decide 
whether to gestate or parent.”). 
101. Hensel, supra note 91, at 143. 
102. Id. 
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the injury. In Becker v. Schwartz, the court argued that it lacked the 
competence to decide “[w]hether it is better never to have been born at all 
than to have been born with even gross deficiencies.”103 Concerned not 
only with a lack of precedent but with the implications of its decision, the 
court continued, “Would claims be honored, assuming the breach of an 
identifiable duty, for less than a perfect birth? And by what standard or by 
whom would perfection be defined?”104 The majority of jurisdictions 
support wrongful birth claims, while only a few—California, New Jersey, 
and Washington—allow wrongful life actions.105 
PGD has not to this point substantially changed the law in this area from 
that which existed with other forms of prenatal screening.106 Yet the 
counterfactual differs in the case of PGD. In prior cases, the alternative, 
absent improper genetic counseling and testing during pregnancy, was an 
abortion. Wrongful life suits were rarely successful because the alternative 
to the difficult life of the child with the chromosome abnormality or disease 
that the parents sought to avoid through intervention was non-existence. 
Now, the comparison can be the harm between implanting a healthy 
embryo and the unhealthy embryo that was mistakenly implanted.107 
The transition between technologies can be seen in Paretta v. Medical 
Offices for Human Reproduction.108 In that case, the Parettas conceived by 
creating an embryo from a carefully selected egg donor and Gerard 
Paretta’s sperm. Although the egg donor was a known carrier of cystic 
 
103. Becker, 386 N.E.2d at 812 (“Simply put, a cause of action brought on behalf of an 
infant seeking recovery for wrongful life demands a calculation of damages 
dependent upon a comparison between the Hobson’s choice of life in an impaired 
state and nonexistence.”). 
104. Id. 
105. Hensel, supra note 91, at 161-62; see Procanik v. Cillo, 478 A.2d 755, 762-63 (1984) 
(rejecting a wrongful life claim for general damages but allowing the recovery of 
extraordinary medical expenses, stating that the decision “is not premised on the 
concept that non-life is preferable to an impaired life, but is predicated on the 
needs of the living”); Turpin v. Sortini, 643 P.2d 954, 957-59 (1982) (finding that 
“it is hard to see how an award of damages to a severely handicapped or suffering 
child would ‘disavow’ the value of life or in any way suggest that the child is not 
entitled to the full measure of legal and nonlegal rights and privileges accorded to 
all members of society”). 
106. See Kate Wevers, Note, Prenatal Torts and Pre-Implantation Genetic Diagnosis, 24 
HARV. J.L. & TECH. 257, 266-67 (2010). 
107. Id. at 268 (“From the parents’ perspective, the counterfactual in a case of post-
pregnancy negligence is abortion. The counterfactual in a case of preconception 
negligence is not conceiving. In a PGD context, however, the most likely 
counterfactual is that the parents would have given birth at the same time to a 
different child with the same genetic parents.”); Reisman, supra note 91, at 407-
08 (arguing that if one uses Parfit’s work on identity to assume that an embryo 
lacks an identity, then selecting one embryo or another does not change the 
identity of the child born but instead only the characteristics of that individual). 
108. See Paretta v. Med. Offices for Human Reprod., 195 Misc. 2d 568 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
2003). 
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fibrosis, no one ever told the Parettas or tested Mr. Paretta. The baby was 
conceived using IVF and born with the disease. Although Becker prevented 
any recovery on the child’s behalf or for the parents’ emotional distress, the 
Paretta court distinguished Becker because there was no claim in Becker 
that the “physicians’ treatment caused the abnormalities in the child.”109 In 
Paretta, however, the plaintiffs alleged that the doctors “had a role in [the 
child’s] genetic composition.”110 Ultimately, though, the court refused to 
take the next step and found that the child, “however, like any other baby, 
does not have a protected right to be born free of genetic defects.”111 Any 
other conclusion would give children conceived with ARTs “more rights and 
expectations than children conceived without,”112 which is exactly the 
concern with increasing recognition of a wrongful life tort. 
Yet it seems unlikely that tort law will not find a way to compensate 
couples who expect to produce a child free of genetic defects—because 
that is what the medical service they are buying purports to provide—and 
produce an unhealthy child as a result of negligence. The injury is apparent 
if we assume that parents have a right to select particular offspring or 
design their families in a way that fertility clinics advertise. 
A review of recent cases addressing failures of PGD to produce healthy 
children shows, however, that most courts are still reluctant to find that an 
injury exists when parents conceive an unhealthy child. In Doolan v. IVF 
America (MA), Inc.,113 the court found that a child conceived with cystic 
fibrosis in spite of attempts to select a healthy embryo through PGD did not 
have a negligence claims against the hospital. Rejecting what it viewed as a 
wrongful life claim, the court stated: 
[T]he essence of Thomas Doolan’s claim is not that the alleged 
negligence of the defendants caused him to be born with cystic 
fibrosis, but rather that the alleged negligence of the defendants 
denied his parents the opportunity to choose not to conceive and 
give birth to him. This is precisely the ‘fundamental problem of logic’ 
that the [Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts] sought to 
avoid.114 
 
109. Id. at 575. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 576. 
112. Id. 
113. See Doolan v. IVF Am., Inc., No. 993476, 2000 WL 33170944 at *5 (Mass. Super. 
Nov. 20, 2000). 
114. Id. at *4; Even in California, which recognizes the tort of wrongful life, some judges 
have found reasons to reject PGD tort claims. In Bergero v. University of Southern 
California Keck School of Medicine, No. B200595, 2009 WL 946874 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Apr. 9, 2009), the parents of Gabriel Rubell Bergero attempted to use PGD through 
a procedure called polymerase chain reaction (PCR) to deselect embryos with 
Fabry disease. Although experienced with IVF, the University of Southern 
California (USC) had only performed IVF for PCR once or twice before Gabriel’s 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Reproductive Selection Bias 
289 
As the use of PGD increases and its cost declines with increasing 
efficiency and economies of scale, there will inevitably be more attempts to 
expand recognition of the tort of wrongful life. The more reliable the 
technology becomes, the more actionable negligence seems. With 
recognition that a fertility clinic’s negligence resulted in the selection of the 
wrong embryo and a large emotional and financial burden on the parents 
and the child, the law will find a way to compensate for this injury. 
One concern with the tort law claims is the effect they have on the 
disabled, who are inevitably stigmatized by the idea that the disability 
makes life so meaningless that the disabled embryo should never have been 
selected or the parent should have been given the choice to abort the 
child.115 Although many scholars argue practically that there is a child who 
needs care and these suits are only a method to obtain money to improve 
the child’s quality of life, others argue that the harm to the disabled as a 
group presents a larger problem.116 
 
case. Id. at *3. After testing, Gabriel’s parents agreed to implant two embryos that 
they thought were female Fabry carriers since none of the embryos were Fabry 
free and the symptoms are typically much less severe in women. Pregnancy with 
a male child afflicted with Fabry resulted. Id. at *4. 
 The IVF specialist at USC, Dr. Richard Paulson, “conceded that Rubell might have 
wanted to know about USC’s limited IVF for PCR experience. He also stated that 
he understood a patient might want to know that USC’s IVF for PCR procedures 
were performed eight to 10 months apart.” Id. at *11. The jury concluded, 
however, that USC was not negligent, and the appellate court affirmed, because 
in informed consent cases the physician’s failure to inform must cause the injury 
to the plaintiff. A physician is only liable where a reasonable person would not 
have gone forward with the treatment had she known the information. See also 
Doe v. Illinois Masonic Medical Center, 297 Ill. App. 3d 240 (1998) (denying 
plaintiffs access to hospital documents where they participated in a hospital 
program designed to reduce the incidence of cystic fibrosis through PGD and, 
subsequently, gave birth to a baby girl with cystic fibrosis). 
115. See Hensel, supra note 91, at 144 (“Wrongful birth and wrongful life suits may 
exact a heavy price not only on the psychological well-bring of individuals with 
disabilities, but also on the public image and acceptance of disability in society. 
Rather than focusing on a defendant’s conduct, as in a traditional tort action, both 
wrongful birth and wrongful life suits ultimately focus on the plaintiff’s disability, 
a status that is at least partially a societal construction.”). 
116. See, e.g., id. (“Any benefits secured by individual litigants in court are thus taxed 
to the community of people with disabilities as a whole, placing at risk, in the drive 
for individual compensation, the gains secured by collective action and identity.”). 
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B. Family Law 
As the use of IVF has increased, so have disputes over frozen 
embryos,117 particularly in the event of divorce.118 Either couples do not 
consider before creating embryos what should happen in the event of 
unforeseen circumstances, or courts refuse to enforce their agreements.119 
PGD will likely change this body of law because it increases the degree of 
attachment and, at times, desperation that those fighting for the right to 
use the embryos will feel. Those utilizing IVF and therapeutic PGD to create 
embryos have, on average, spent more money trying to conceive than those 
using IVF alone. Because these prospective parents discard or deselect 
unhealthy embryos, it frequently takes more IVF attempts to create healthy 
embryos to implant. This results not only in a more time-consuming process 
but also in more discomfort for the woman producing the eggs and in 
anxiety for the couple. 
In addition, the question remains whether and how courts will factor 
into the analysis the possibility that, if the parent seeking to use the 
embryos is also the one with the genetic condition that caused the couple 
to use PGD and is not granted the right to implant the embryos, he or she 
may then be more likely to have a child through natural methods to avoid 
the additional expense and effort. This could result in sick babies instead of 
healthy babies. I first review current frameworks for deciding embryo 
disputes and then argue that an increase in the use of therapeutic PGD will 
result in greater use of the balancing test and further serve to emphasize 
the value and importance of babies created using PGD. 
Courts have utilized different frameworks for deciding embryo 
disputes: (1) a contractual framework, (2) a contemporaneous mutual 
 
117. Courts differentiate between the embryo and pre-embryo stages of fertilization. 
“The pre[-]embryo comes into existence with the first cell division and lasts until 
the appearance of a single primitive streak, which is the first sign of organ 
differentiation. This [primitive streak] occurs at about fourteen days of 
development.” See Litowitz v. Litowitz, 48 P.3d 261, 262, amended sub nom. In re 
of Marriage of Litowitz, 53 P.3d 516 (Wash. 2002) (alteration in original) (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). This article will use the term 
embryo to refer to both embryos and pre-embryos. 
118. See, e.g., Deborah L. Forman, Embryo Disposition, Divorce & Family Law 
Contracting: A Model for Enforceability, 24 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 378, 387-81 
(2013); Mark P. Strasser, You Take the Embryos But I Get the House (and the 
Business): Recent Trends in Awards Involving Embryos Upon Divorce, 57 BUFF. L. 
REV. 1159, 1159 (2009); Angela K. Upchurch, The Deep Freeze: A Critical 
Examination of the Resolution of Frozen Embryo Disputes Through the Adversarial 
Process, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 395, 396 (2005). 
119. See Michael T. Flannery, “Rethinking” Embryo Disposition Upon Divorce, 29 J. 
CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 233, 233 (“This problem arises either because couples 
fail to expressly state their intent for disposition upon divorce through contract, 
or public policy renders such contracts unenforceable.”). 
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consent framework, and (3) a balancing framework.120 Because many 
fertility centers require clients to decide what will be done with the 
embryos before they are created, particularly in the event of divorce, courts 
frequently enforce these agreements using a contractual framework, which 
typically prevents the use of the embryos after a separation.121 Even 
scholars who use contractual principles of interpretation to argue against 
the use of embryos after divorce where an agreement is made ex ante to 
allow the use of the embryos after divorce make an exception, however, for 
a party who has no other chance to conceive.122 
Under the contemporaneous mutual consent framework, both parents 
must agree to implant the embryos for one parent to use them, regardless 
of what any previous written agreements state on the disposition of those 
embryos. Only Iowa endorses this framework.123 In re Marriage of Witten124 
applied the contemporaneous mutual consent framework, refusing to 
enforce an embryo-storage agreement signed by Tamera and Arthur Witten 
but also refusing to allow Tamera Witten to use the embryos to conceive a 
child. Looking not just at precedent but also at legal scholarship, the Iowa 
Supreme Court found that “[t]he contractual approach and the 
contemporaneous mutual consent model share an underlying premise: 
‘decisions about the disposition of frozen embryos belong to the couple 
 
120. Id. I take no position on debates over what should happen to the embryos if not 
implanted. Currently unregulated, that is a subject beyond the scope of this paper. 
121. See Litowitz, 48 P. 3d at 268-71 (enforcing agreement with fertility center to thaw 
and discard embryos five years after cryopreservation unless parties mutually 
agreed to extend the contract in spite of later changes between the biological 
father and intended mother of the embryos); Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174, 180-82 
(N.Y. 1998) (enforcing parties’ prior consent form to donate embryos to research 
in the event of divorce and noting that “[a]dvance agreements as to disposition 
would have little purpose if they were enforceable only in the event the parties 
continued to agree”); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588, 597 (Tenn. 1992) (concluding 
in dicta that ex-ante agreements on disposition of embryos at certain 
contingencies should be enforced unless superseded by later mutual agreement); 
cf. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051, 1057-59 (Mass. 2000) (finding husband’s consent 
to wife’s control of embryos after separation on the fertility center’s consent form 
invalid because incomplete but stating that agreement would be enforceable 
regardless for public policy reasons); Dara E. Purvis, Expectant Fathers, Abortion, 
and Embryos, 43 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 330, 335 (2015). But see Alex M. Johnson, Jr., 
The Legality of Contracts Governing the Disposition of Embryos: Unenforceable 
Intra-Family Agreements, 43 SW. L. REV. 191, 193-96 (2013) (arguing that these 
agreements should be viewed as gratuitous promises based on the marital 
relationship existing at the time that are unenforceable in the event of divorce). 
122. See, e.g., Johnson, Jr., supra note 121, at 203 (finding that reliance may justify 
enforcing agreements where “the inability of one of the parties to exercise their 
reproductive ability in the future without the use of the gametic material that is 
the subject of the disputed agreement, which fact is known to the other 
contributor of gametic material at the time of contribution” (citation omitted)). 
123. Purvis, supra note 121, at 335. 
124. In Re Marriage of Witten, 672 N.W.2d 768 (Iowa 2003). 
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that created the embryo, with each partner entitled to an equal say in how 
the embryos should be disposed.’”125 
The difference between the two frameworks is the question of when 
the parties must consent. Citing research on frequent changes in decisions 
about embryo disposition before and after creation, the Iowa court chose 
the contemporaneous mutual consent approach because it requires that 
neither partner remove the embryos from cryostorage and use them in any 
way unless the other partner consents at the time of removal.126 The Iowa 
court noted that it 
think[s], however, that it would be against the public policy of this 
state to enforce a prior agreement between the parties in this highly 
personal area of reproductive choice when one of the parties has 
changed his or her mind concerning the disposition or use of the 
embryos.127 
Courts have generally held that one parent’s right not to be a parent 
outweighs the other parent’s right to have a baby when using the third 
framework, a balancing test.128 Notably, however, there is “a different 
balance when the stored pre-embryo may be the mother’s last chance to 
be a genetic mother . . . [and] the circumstances overcome the right not to 
 
125. Id. at 777 (quoting Carl H. Coleman, Procreative Liberty and Contemporaneous 
Choice: An Inalienable Rights Approach to Frozen Embryo Disputes, 84 MINN. L. REV. 
55, 81 (1999)). 
126. Id. at 778 (“Although this model precludes one party’s use of the embryos to have 
children over the objection of the other party, the outcome under the contractual 
approach and the balancing test would generally be the same.” (citation 
omitted)). 
127. Id. at 780-81; see id. at 783 (“The practical effect will be that the embryos are 
stored indefinitely unless both parties can agree to destroy the fertilized eggs. 
Thus, any expense associated with maintaining the status quo should logically be 
borne by the person opposing destruction.” (citation omitted)). 
128. See Johnson, Jr., supra note 121, at 222-24 (noting that courts have refused to 
enforce contracts agreeing to the disposition of embryos after separation where 
one party no longer wants to be a parent because of the facts surrounding the 
creation of these agreements). 
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be a parent.”129 This exception was enforced in Reber v. Reiss,130 where the 
Superior Court of Pennsylvania found that Lynn Reiss’s right to procreate 
outweighed her ex-husband, Howard Reber’s, right not to procreate where 
it was almost certainly her only chance to be a biological parent and likely 
her only chance to be a parent at all given her health history. Reiss delayed 
treatment for breast cancer for several weeks after diagnosis to undergo 
IVF and create embryos with Reber, knowing that cancer treatments would 
substantially impede her fertility. The parties subsequently divorced. Reiss 
sought to implant the embryos over Reber’s objection, and, with no 
previous agreement as to disposition of the embryos in the event of 
divorce, the court awarded the embryos to Reiss. The court stated that 
“unless and until our legislatures decide to tackle this issue, our courts must 
consider the individual circumstances of each case.”131 
In another, well-publicized battle,132 the Appellate Court of Illinois 
awarded custody of embryos to Karla Dunston over the objections of her 
 
129. Purvis, supra note 121, at 331 (“[I]ndeterminacy allows for the relative importance 
of male and female expectational parental interests to play a greater role in the 
court’s analysis.”); see Szafranski v. Duston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 515 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 
2013) (“Courts applying the balancing approach have noted that a party’s inability 
to have a child weighs in his or her favor.” (citation omitted)); J.B. v. M.B., 783 
A.2d 707, 716 (N.J. 2001) (holding that ordinarily the right not to procreate should 
trump the right to procreate and denying husband custody of embryos for 
donation where he remained fertile with the caveat that the court reached no 
conclusion on the outcome where “a party who has become infertile seeks use of 
stored pre-embryos against the wishes of his or her partner”); Davis v. Davis, 842 
S.W.2d 588, 604 (Tenn. 1992) (finding that husband’s interests in avoiding 
procreation outweighed wife’s interest in donating embryos after her remarriage 
following divorce but stating in dicta that “[t]he case would be closer if Mary Sue 
Davis were seeking to use the pre-embryos herself, but only if she could not 
achieve parenthood by any other reasonable means”); I. Glenn Cohen, The Right 
Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1193 (2008) [hereinafter Cohen 
II] (“While it seems that the interest in avoiding unwanted genetic parenthood is 
greater than the general interest in access to particular genetic material, one 
might think that the balance between the interests is different when not having 
access to the pre[-]embryos makes it impossible to have any genetic children at 
all.”); cf. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000) (refusing to enforce agreement 
allowing wife to implant embryos after separation where couple already had two 
children). 
130. Reber v. Reiss, 42 A.3d 1131 (Pa. Super. 2012). 
131. Id. at 1142 (overruling husband’s objections where wife promised not to seek child 
support and agreed to allow husband to be as involved as he wanted in the child’s 
life and striking down his argument that he never intended to procreate with his 
wife given the nature of IVF). 
132. See, e.g., Kim Bellware, Her Last Chance For a Baby. His Fight Against Forced 
Fatherhood. The Court Must Decide., HUFFINGTON POST (Jan. 26, 2015), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/01/22/illinois-frozen-
embryo_n_6348920.html; Angie Leventis Lourgo & Bonnie Miller Rubin, Court 
Gives Frozen Embryos to Chicago Woman Over Ex-Boyfriend’s Objection, CHI. TRIB. 
(June 12, 2015), http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/local/breaking/ct-
embryos-court-ruling-met-20150612-story.html; Madeleine Schwartz, Who Owns 
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ex-boyfriend, Jacob Szafranski.133 In the first appeal in the case,134 the court 
found, after reviewing precedent, that embryos in dispute should be 
disposed of (1) according to any ex ante agreement of the parties or (2) by 
weighing the parties’ interests in the absence of an agreement. After the 
lower court on remand awarded the embryos to Dunston, the appellate 
court affirmed. 
Dunston and Szafranski had been dating for a few months, and neither 
“expected their relationship to result in marriage” when Dunston was 
diagnosed with non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma.135 At that time, Dunston delayed 
treatment to undergo IVF and Szafranski agreed to donate sperm to create 
embryos instead of having her use donor sperm. Although the couple 
signed an informed consent agreement, the agreement did not provide for 
disposition in the event that the couple separated and indicated only that 
the fertility clinic would adhere to any separate agreement of the parties.136 
The parties visited a lawyer and discussed both co-parenting and sperm 
donation contracts but never executed an agreement.137 After the couple 
broke up, Szafranski confirmed in an email that the choice of using the 
embryos was Dunston’s, but he subsequently changed his mind and 
demanded that she not use the embryos.138 
Szafranski conceded that the parties reached an oral agreement prior 
to signing the fertility clinic’s informed consent and creating the embryos. 
The court held that Szafranski intended at the time the contract was created 
to help Dunston produce embryos for the purpose of having her own 
biological children and the parties did not contemplate giving him a veto 
over the use of the embryos.139 
The court also found that the application of a balancing test supported 
awarding the embryos to Dunston. Her last chance to have a biological child 
 
Pre-Embryos?, NEW YORKER (Apr. 28, 2015), 
http://www.newyorker.com/tech/elements/who-owns-pre-embryos. 
133. Szafranski v. Duston, 34 N.E.3d 1132, 1133 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2015), cert. denied, 136 
S. Ct. 1230 (2016). 
134. Szafranski v. Duston, 993 N.E.2d 502, 515 (Ill.App. 1 Dist. 2013) (“In addition to 
holding that agreements between the parties should be honored, we further hold 
that where there has been no advance agreement regarding the disposition of 
pre-embryos, ‘then the relative interests of the parties in using or not using the 
pre-embryos must be weighed.’ Although we acknowledge that this is not an ideal 
way to resolve a dispute implicating reproductive rights, we note that ‘what is 
even worse . . . is to give a possibly antagonized ex-spouse the power to either 
block parentage or to name the price that potential parentage will cost.’” 
(citations omitted)). 
135. Szafranksi, 34 N.E.3d at 1137. 
136. Id. at 1138. 
137. Id. at 1139. 
138. Id. at 1141. 
139. Id. at 1149. 
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outweighed his concerns over the stigma of conceiving a child in this 
manner.140 In weighing heavily Dunston’s desire to have a biological child, 
the court “decline[d] to make a judicial determination that alternative 
methods of parenthood offer Karla an acceptable substitute to biological 
parenthood.”141 
The exception made here to the general right not to procreate when 
balancing interests in embryo-custody disputes is easily analogous to 
disputes likely to arise as the prevalence of therapeutic PGD increases. In 
those cases, denying a parent with a gene for a genetic illness the chance 
to use embryos that have undergone PGD could result in: (1) that parent 
not being able to have a genetic child because of the risk of passing on the 
gene during natural conception, depending on age and resources to 
undergo further IVF and PGD to create more embryos; or (2) an increased 
risk that the parent seeking to use the embryos will conceive naturally and 
pass on the gene because of the desire to have a genetic child, again, 
depending on age and resources to undergo further procedures. In the first 
outcome, the balance is similar to the cases discussed above. The right to 
have a genetic child weighs heavily. In the second outcome, which assumes 
that the parent seeking to use the embryos has the alternative of natural 
conception, courts will have to weigh whether there is a right to have a 
healthy genetic child and whether that right outweighs another person’s 
right not to procreate. Courts have weighed heavily the right to be a genetic 
parent, and this indicates that they will likely put a thumb on the scale again 
for the right to be a genetic parent of a healthy child. Yet, this runs the risk 
of giving those who use ARTs more rights than those who do not, since 
there is no right to a healthy child or right to be a healthy child. 
Another question is how courts should weigh the interest of society in 
producing healthier children. If a parent with a gene for a genetic illness 
loses the chance to reproduce through therapeutic PGD and instead 
decides to conceive naturally in spite of the risk of passing on the gene, 
society will bear at least part of the cost of the child’s illness through 
increased medical costs and decreased productivity as an adult. Should the 
courts be concerned with these social costs? 
In The Right Not to Be a Genetic Parent?, Glenn Cohen argues that 
“many of these authorities have erred by conceiving of a monolithic right 
not to procreate, and we should instead recognize a bundle of rights having 
multiple possible sticks, consisting of a right not to be a gestational, legal, 
and genetic parent.”142 Obviously, the right to be a gestational parent 
belongs only to a woman, while the other two sticks can belong to either 
 
140. Id. at 1162 (“Karla testified that she was ‘devastated’ upon learning that she would 
lose her fertility and thought about how she wants to have a child ‘with part of’ 
her father, who passed away when she was five years old.”). 
141. Id. at 1163. 
142. Cohen II, supra note 129, at 1121. 
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men or women.143 Cohen asserts that the right not to be a genetic parent 
would be based on “unwanted ‘attributional parenthood,’ a harm that 
comes from the social assignment of the status of parent to the provider of 
genetic material that persist notwithstanding the fact that the legal system 
has declared him or her a nonparent.”144 
To my point, Cohen questions whether society has distinct interests 
that should affect what law determines the outcome of these disputes.145 
While he gives the example of what would happen if there were evidence 
that children born over one genetic parent’s objection were “1000 times 
more likely to commit violent crimes compared to the population at 
large,”146 my question here is what would happen if there were evidence 
that discarding the embryos—valuing the right not to be a genetic parent 
over the right to be a genetic parent—resulted in children born to the 
partner who sought genetic parenthood that were 1000 times more likely 
to have a serious genetic illness or chromosome abnormality. Cohen also 
questions how that balance changes if the person seeking to implant the 
embryos already has one or more genetic children.147 
The tendency for courts to make an exception to the right not to 
procreate due to the importance of conceiving a genetic child results in an 
inference that the greater stakes in cases where a parent may otherwise 
conceive an unhealthy child will cause courts to increasingly favor the rights 
of those seeking to conceive through therapeutic PGD. Regardless of 
whether courts increasingly recognize the wrongful life tort, and I believe 
that they will, an emphasis on the rights of those who seek to conceive 
through therapeutic PGD inevitably stigmatizes the lives of those who are 
born with genes for genetic illnesses because their parents did not want to 
or could not afford to conceive using this procedure. In the next section, I 
argue that there is an administrative law solution to the disparity 
attributable to the high cost of PGD. 
III. Access for “Other Groups” 
Assuming it is not repealed, the ACA presents an opportunity to expand 
access to therapeutic PGD and other ARTs. The statute’s goal of expanding 
access to health insurance and its antidiscrimination framework fit nicely 
with my arguments above about the need to expand access to reproductive 
 
143. Id. 
144. Id. at 1125. 
145. Id. at 1133 (“That would give society a reason to oppose that pre[-]embryo’s 
coming into being even if we assume that coming into being was in the pre[-
]embryo’s best interest--although that reason might still be defeated, for 
example, by society’s countervailing interest in protecting procreative 
autonomy.”). 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 1195. 
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rights. These rights could also be incorporated under the essential health 
benefit provisions. 
Scholars discussing the ACA’s antidiscrimination provision have focused 
on whether it meets the challenge of providing a basic, equivalent level of 
health insurance to all, albeit within a two-track system of public and 
private benefits.148 As discussed further below, Jessica Roberts has focused 
on the need to shift from an antidiscrimination framework to a fundamental 
rights framework to decide which benefits are required to provide everyone 
with meaningful access to health insurance.149 She reserves the question of 
which benefits should be included on this list and who should decide. Here, 
I argue that ARTs such as IVF and PGD to screen out embryos with a genetic 
predisposition for illnesses that either result in early death or significantly 
impair quality of life should be included on that list of essential health 
benefits in spite of concerns about the overemphasis on genetic ties and 
the slippery slope to eugenics. 
I argue that Section 1557 of the ACA should be considered a positive 
right in this situation to avoid the disparate impact that wealth has on 
healthcare access. The Secretary of Health and Human Services (“HHS”), 
now or in the next administration, should consider the desire of lower-
income individuals to produce healthy children when defining essential 
health benefits under the ACA. Although my proposed solution does not 
impact those covered by Medicaid, a subject for another article, it is a start 
at closing an important gap in our healthcare system and enforcing equal 
reproductive rights for all. 
A. A Positive Right under the ACA 
Statutory antidiscrimination provisions in health insurance 
demonstrate the tension between a private system that must rely on 
efficiency and focus on cost to profit and the desire of government to fairly 
care for all citizens. They suppress the use of traits to forecast policy losses 
by prohibiting insurance “carriers from relying on characteristics that are 
 
148. See Sidney D. Watson, Section 1557 of the Affordable Care Act: Civil Rights, Health 
Reform, Race, and Equity, 55 HOW. L.J. 855, 857-58 (2012) (“Because the ACA 
continues the tradition of Medicaid for the poor and a variety of private insurance 
offerings for wealthier Americans, it has the potential to perpetuate America’s 
dual track medical care with one system serving mostly white patients with private 
insurance and a different system for poorer, mostly minority patients with 
Medicaid. In fact, the ACA may exacerbate this two-tier system by creating a third 
tier of moderate-income Americans, half of whom are people of color, who obtain 
their health insurance through the new Exchanges using federal tax credit 
subsidies. By maintaining multiple sources of health insurance, the ACA may serve 
to reinforce and further segregate patients along racial lines.”). 
149. Jessica L. Roberts, “Healthism”: A Critique of the Antidiscrimination Approach to 
Health Insurance and Health-Care Reform, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1159, 1197 (2012). 
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socially suspect, thus preventing insurers from exacerbating or trading on 
inequalities that exist outside of the insurance system.”150 
Fairness concerns dominate in the context of genetic discrimination.151 
Adverse selection concerns are muted because the predisposition for a 
genetic illness typically involves a long time-horizon and a probability of 
acquiring the illness rather than a certainty (although dominant traits like 
the gene for Huntington’s disease manifest one-hundred percent of the 
time when the gene is present). Most health insurers are concerned with 
short-term risks because participants may switch health insurance plans 
many times.152 
As Wendy Mariner notes, however, “[c]ommercial health insurance 
policies occupy a somewhat unusual space among lines of insurance. They 
cross the boundary between conventional insurance and service contracts, 
because they cover both fortuitous losses, like accidental injuries and heart 
attacks, and predictable ‘losses,’ such as preventive services.”153 The 
definition of preventive services is shifting with the growing wave of genetic 
selection and the future of genetic engineering.154 Whether a positive right 
to reproductive liberty is located in the Constitution, the ACA’s 
antidiscrimination provision, or under the ACA’s essential health benefits 
requirement is less important than recognizing that the model for health 
insurance is not changing with increasing coverage of ARTs–only the 
 
150. Ronen Avraham, Kyle D. Logue & Daniel Schwarcz, Towards a Universal 
Framework for Insurance Anti-Discrimination Laws, 21 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 3 (2014-15) 
(examining how state insurance antidiscrimination laws generally balance 
“efficiency” and “fairness”); The article notes that employer-sponsored health 
insurance assuages the concern about adverse selection by spreading the risk and 
cost of caring for employees in poor health or with a “genetic predisposition to 
illness” among the larger, more diverse group. Id. at 28-29. 
151. Id. at 32 (“Genetic discrimination in the context of health, life, and disability 
insurance immediately evokes Nazi Germany and its obsession with promoting the 
reproduction of more ‘genetically desired’ people and eliminating ‘genetically 
defective’ individuals. Under this worldview, Nazis first forced those with 
Huntington’s disease to be sterilized and later murdered them in extermination 
facilities. The United States also has a history of forced sterilization based on 
supposed genetic defects.” (citations omitted)). 
152. Id. at 33. This is also one reason why health insurers are reluctant to fund 
expensive preventive care like therapeutic PGD to reduce or eliminate the risk of 
members acquiring genetic diseases. Although an insurer enrolls the parents 
before birth (when the costs for such treatment are incurred) and the child at 
birth, it is unlikely to continue to insure the child later on in life when the disease 
would manifest (and the cost savings from prevention are felt). 
153. Wendy K. Mariner, The Picture Begins to Assert Itself: Rules of Construction for 
Essential Health Benefits in Health Insurance Plans Subject to the Affordable Care 
Act, 24 ANNALS HEALTH L. 437, 451 (2015) (citations omitted). 
154. See Tetsuya Ishii, Germ Line Genome Editing in Clinics: The Approaches, Objectives 
and Global Society, 16 BRIEFINGS FUNCTIONAL GENOMICS 1 (2015) (describing how a 
new technique called CRISPR that allows genome editing is being utilized in ARTs 
for prevention of diseases as well as genetic enhancement). 
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definition of preventive care is. Because I think it unlikely that courts will 
find that failing to provide everyone with IVF and PGD is a violation of the 
rights to equal protection and substantive due process, I focus on the choice 
between the ACA’s antidiscrimination provision and its essential health 
benefits requirement. The antidiscrimination provision is broad and permits 
discrimination against those with genetic illnesses by proxy, and I therefore 
argue that the Secretary should use statutory discretion to include 
therapeutic PGD among the EHBs. 
1. Antidiscrimination 
Section 1557 of the ACA states that individuals may not “be excluded 
from participating in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to 
discrimination under, any health program or activity” that receives federal 
funding—including credits and subsidies—or is administered by a 
government entity on the “grounds prohibited under title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964, title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, the Age 
Discrimination Act of 1975, or section 794 of title 29.”155 Those grounds 
include race, sex, age, and disability.156 
The ACA’s antidiscrimination provision regulates the content of 
insurance. And significantly, the ACA targets both intentional discrimination 
and de facto discrimination, or “facially neutral practices with a 
discriminatory impact.”157 The final rule provides specifically that the HHS 
Office of Civil Rights (“OCR”) “interprets section 1557 as authorizing a 
private right of action for claims of disparate impact discrimination on the 
basis of any of the criteria enumerated in the legislation.”158 Although the 
OCR will adjudicate violations of section 1557 under Title VI of the Civil 
Rights Act, individuals can sue directly under section 1557.159 
 
155. 42 U.S.C. § 18116(a) (2010) (citations omitted). The statute makes clear that this 
provision is not designed to limit or supersede the cited statutes. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 18116(b) (2010). 
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (race, color, and national origin); 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2012) (sex); 
42 U.S.C. § 6101 (age); 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2014) (disability). 
157. Mastroianni, supra note 7, at 172. 
158. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 31376, 31440 
(May 18, 2016) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 92). 
159. 45 C.F.R. § 92.301 (2016); see Rumble v. Fairview Health Servs., No. 14-cv-2037 
(SRN/FLN), 2015 WL 1197415, at *11 (D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2015) (“[I]t appears 
Congress intended to create a new, health-specific, anti-discrimination cause of 
action that is subject to a singular standard, regardless of plaintiff’s protected class 
status. Reading Section 1557 otherwise would lead to an illogical result, as 
different enforcement mechanisms and standards would apply to a Section 1557 
plaintiff depending on whether plaintiff’s claim is based on her race, sex, age, or 
disability. For instance, a plaintiff bringing a Section 1557 race discrimination claim 
could allege only disparate treatment, but plaintiffs bringing Section 1557 age, 
disability, or sex discrimination claims could allege disparate treatment or 
disparate impact.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)); Timothy Jost, HHS 
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The question remains whether courts will favor disparate impact claims 
under the ACA.160 Regardless, disparate impact litigation has a troubled 
history in Title VII employment discrimination claims and other areas of the 
law, and it is arguably inconsistent with equal protection under the 
Constitution.161 Thus, disparate impact litigation may not be the tool to 
protect a negative right to be free from affirmative—though 
unintentional—discrimination that it was previously considered, let alone a 
place to find a positive right to health insurance opportunities.162 
The question of whether “programs that endeavor to remediate the 
harms done to a subordinated or disadvantaged class fundamentally differ 
from those that create or perpetuate subordination” and, therefore, do not 
violate equal protection,163 differs greatly in the context of health 
insurance. First, the costs of providing increased opportunities for equality 
among different races and for women are dispersed among a much larger 
number of people. In Ricci v. DeStefano, white and Hispanic firefighters 
(“Firefighters”) brought suit against the city of New Haven, Connecticut 
(“City”) under Title VII after the City refused to certify the results of a 
promotion examination due to a statistical disparity between white 
candidates’ results minority candidates’ results.164 The Firefighters claimed 
 
Issues Health Equity Final Rule, HEALTH AFF. BLOG (May 14, 2016), 
http://healthaffairs.org/blog/2016/05/14/hhs-issues-health-equity-final-rule/. 
160. Govind Persad, Priority Setting, Cost-Effectiveness, and the Affordable Care Act, 41 
AM. J.L. & MED. 119, 160 (2015) (noting the recent trend of the Supreme Court to 
disfavor disparate impact claims under a variety of antidiscrimination statutes and 
querying whether the ACA will be treated similarly). 
161. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 585 (2009) (holding that “before an employer 
can engage in intentional discrimination for the asserted purpose of avoiding or 
remedying an unintentional disparate impact, the employer must have a strong 
basis in evidence to believe it will be subject to disparate-impact liability if it fails 
to take the race-conscious, discriminatory action”); Samuel R. Bagenstos, The 
Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1, 20-24 
(2006) (arguing for a structural approach, such as the disparate impact doctrine, 
to employment antidiscrimination law); Robert Belton, Title VII at Forty: A Brief 
Look at the Birth, Death, and Resurrection of the Disparate Impact Theory of 
Discrimination, 22 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 431, 454-63 (2005) (discussing how the 
disparate impact doctrine moved forward antidiscrimination law by making 
unintentional, as well as intentional, discrimination illegal and the history of 
difficulties that the disparate impact theory has faced); Michael Selmi, Was 
Disparate Impact Theory a Mistake?, 53 UCLA L. REV. 701, 732-45 (2006) 
(documenting the limitations of the disparate impact doctrine). 
162. See, e.g., Cheryl I. Harris & Kimberly West-Faulcon, Reading Ricci: Whitening 
Discrimination, Racing Test Fairness, 58 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 73, 157-65 (2010); Cedric 
Merlin Powell, Harvesting New Conceptions of Equality: Opportunity, Results, and 
Neutrality, 31 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 255, 259-61 (2012). 
163. Lawrence Rosenthal, Saving Disparate Impact, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 2157, 2205 
(2013) (arguing that the disparate impact theory of liability and the Equal 
Protection Clause can, and should, be reconciled). 
164. Ricci, 557 U.S. at 561-62. 
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that refusal to certify the results constituted discrimination against them on 
the basis of their race.165 The City claimed that if they had certified the 
results they would have faced liability under Title VII “for adopting a 
practice having a disparate impact on minority firefighters.”166 The Court 
held that an action such as the City’s refusal to certify the results “is 
impermissible under Title VII unless the employer can demonstrate a strong 
basis in evidence that, had it not taken the action, it would have been liable 
under the disparate-impact statute.”167 The Court found that the City could 
not meet that threshold standard and, therefore, had violated Title VII.168 
In attempting to effectuate reproductive liberty, however, any increased 
costs for health insurance companies required to cover PGD could be offset 
by cost savings resulting from preventing genetic illnesses or short-term 
government subsidies, or by small general premium increases. 
Second, except for perhaps a minimal increase in health insurance 
premiums, no one is harmed by providing additional health insurance 
opportunities to those with genes for genetic illnesses. No one loses 
insurance because of increasing coverage for therapeutic PGD any more 
than they lose coverage when an expensive new medication or medical 
procedure is covered under those plans. Even if the costs are greater than 
expected, and insurance companies must increase premiums or cut back in 
other ways to provide these benefits, this is the business of health 
insurance. No one would dare suggest that insurance companies not treat 
the genetic illnesses when they manifest because it is too costly. Why 
should coverage for preventive care be any different?169 
Jessica Roberts asserts that the antidiscrimination framework adopted 
under the ACA is simply incompatible with a for-profit health insurance 
industry. The ACA, in spite of good intentions, still burdens the unhealthy 
by using health proxies instead of explicit considerations of health status.170 
Roberts discusses how this “healthism”—or discrimination based on health 
status—becomes illicit discrimination under the ACA and other recent 
statutes prohibiting such discrimination.171 Antidiscrimination frameworks 
 
165. Id. at 562. 
166. Id. at 563. 
167. Id. 
168. Given the Court’s holding, it did not reach the question of whether the City’s 
action violated the Equal Protection Clause. Id. 
169. Nondiscrimination in Health Programs and Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. at 31377 
(“Covered entities should bear in mind the purposes of the ACA and Section 1557 
– to expand access to care and coverage and eliminate barriers to access – in 
interpreting requirements of the final rule.”). 
170. Roberts, supra note 149, at 1161-62. 
171. Id. at 1171-72 (“If health status joins the catalogue of forbidden traits, health 
insurers are undoubtedly discriminators . . . . But what makes one kind of 
differentiation acceptable and another morally reprehensible--and perhaps 
legally actionable--is a complicated question and one that relies heavily on 
historical and cultural context. As one scholar has explained, ‘Discrimination is not 
Health Matrix · Volume 27 · 2017 
Reproductive Selection Bias 
302 
typically prevent decision makers from considering protected traits, forcing 
them into blindness and representing a negative right—the right to be free 
from differentiation due to a suspect categorization.172 An 
antidiscrimination framework transforms acceptable risk allocation and 
profit maximization by insurers into unacceptable discrimination.173 This 
occurs because the traditional methods the health insurance industry uses 
make insurance expensive or unavailable to those who need its services the 
most.174 
The antidiscrimination frameworks of the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (“HIPAA”), the Genetic Information 
Nondiscrimination Act (“GINA”), and the ACA fail to properly protect the 
unhealthy. HIPAA does not require that group health insurers offer any 
particular benefits or limit premiums, keeping insurance out of reach for 
the sick.175 Under GINA, Congress prohibited discrimination based on 
genetic information, in spite of adverse-selection issues, but the statute 
favors the healthy because it excludes “discrimination on the basis of a 
manifested genetic condition once it is diagnosable by other means.”176 
Once a genetic condition results in symptoms that make the disease 
identifiable through means other than genetic testing, GINA offers no 
protection.177 
The ACA prohibits several means of discriminating directly against the 
unhealthy but uses instead proxies that continue to favor the healthy. The 
 
one thing, but many.’” (footnotes omitted)). Some have compared denying health 
insurance to the sick to discrimination based on race. Id. at 1175-76 (“Putting 
health status on par with race constitutes an important rhetorical move, as race 
is widely regarded as the most invidious basis for discrimination.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
172. See id. at 1178. 
173. Id. at 1165 (“Profitable insurance thus relies on accurate, calculable risks . . . . As 
a result, health insurers have historically employed medical information, in 
addition to demographic and behavioral factors like sex, age, and smoking, when 
determining coverage and setting premiums.” (footnotes omitted)). 
174. Id. at 1167. 
175. Id. at 1182 (“While group health insurers cannot discriminate against individuals 
in the group, they can still make group-wide decisions based on health status, such 
as the kind of benefits or coverage to provide or the amount of a premium to 
impose. Thus, if one member of a group develops a serious illness, it can affect 
the health insurance of all group members.” (footnote omitted)). 
176. Id. at 1184 (“GINA defines ‘genetic information’ as the results of an individual’s 
genetic tests, the results of an individual’s family members’ genetic tests, and the 
manifestation of a disease or disorder in an individual’s family.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
177. Id. at 1185 (“Consequently, the statute does not protect the results of a test that 
detects a manifested condition--even if that condition has a genetic basis. Thus, a 
test that diagnoses Huntington’s disease, a genetically based disorder with a one-
hundred percent correlation between the genetic variant and the condition, is not 
a ‘genetic test’ for insurance discrimination purposes.” (footnote omitted)). 
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statute prohibits pre-existing condition exclusions.178 It prevents insurers 
from discriminating in setting premiums for the individual and small-group 
markets, but it permits insurance companies to consider family size, 
geographic location, age, and tobacco use.179 And although the ACA 
prohibits discrimination based on health status, it allows premiums for 
employer-provided plans to fluctuate by up to thirty percent if an employee 
completes a wellness program.180 
The use of proxies to determine premiums particularly disadvantages 
the poor. Considering where a person lives results in harm to the urban and 
rural poor because they have more health problems and fewer health 
facilities. Community rating—requiring insurers to charge the same 
premiums for all health policies sold within a particular area—could harm 
these groups depending on how the boundaries are drawn.181 Similarly, 
since those with lower incomes use tobacco at higher rates, increasing 
premiums based on tobacco use hurts those with lower socioeconomic 
status.182 Congress made trade-offs to continue the private system of health 
insurance that exists alongside our public benefits. A continuation of private 
health insurance requires insurers to keep costs down by increasing costs 
for high-risk participants, now that they cannot be excluded from coverage 
entirely under the ACA’s pre-existing condition and lifetime maximum 
coverage limitations.183 
Roberts suggests a shift from an antidiscrimination framework to a 
fundamental rights framework that bridges equal protection and 
substantive due process.184 The focus shifts from discrimination based on 
 
178. Id. at 1187. 
179. Id. at 1188 (“While individual—and small—group insurers may no longer explicitly 
use past or current health status in determining premiums, they may still vary 
their rates based on these four factors, which may, in fact, serve as crude proxies 
for health status.” (footnote omitted)). 
180. Id. at 1188-90 (“Although the law is not ‘healthist’ on its face, it still favors the 
same individuals who benefited under the preceding system. Within the individual 
and small-group markets, the new rating criteria act as proxies for health and may, 
therefore, perpetuate existing disparities. Within the large-group market, 
wellness programs could likewise adversely affect the sick, who may be unable to 
participate equitably . . . . Although the law succeeds from an antidifferentiation 
standpoint, it fails by producing discriminatory outcomes . . . . To borrow language 
from Title VII doctrine, the new policies will likely have a ‘disparate impact’ on the 
basis of health-related factors.” (footnotes omitted)). 
181. Id. at 1192 (“Importantly, under the new system, an income-based subsidy will be 
available to help offset the cost of health insurance, yet particular lower-income 
populations might still experience disadvantage--most notably the ‘near poor.’”). 
182. Id. at 1193. 
183. Id. at 1164. 
184. Id. at 1197-98 (“[Kenji Yoshino] explains that a growing ‘pluralism anxiety’ has 
pushed the Supreme Court to move away from acknowledging equality concerns 
framed as group-based identity claims in favor of those presented in terms of the 
more expansive doctrines of liberty and universally held fundamental rights. Thus, 
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health status to the lack of “sufficient health-insurance coverage for all 
people.”185 The next step is figuring out what health benefits are required 
under this right to health insurance and who should decide what benefits 
need to be included.186 The discussion moves from who to cover to what 
services to cover, which is precisely what the ACA’s EHB provisions require. 
The reason that I argue the ACA’s antidiscrimination provision is not the 
place to locate a positive right to ARTs is because there is “no logical 
stopping point.”187 Remediating all differential outcomes in utilization of 
health services, which is what a robust disparate-impact jurisprudence 
under the ACA would require, would take more resources than the current 
health insurance system can offer.188 And few would argue that this was the 
intent of the ACA, particularly without greater congressional funding 
attached. 
2. Essential Health Benefits 
Forcing health insurers to cover the cost of IVF and PGD to deselect 
embryos with genes for grave genetic illnesses because it is an essential 
health benefit is compatible with the practices of private insurers. First, 
depending on which genes are included on the list, the percentage of the 
population affected is small, particularly since some will choose not to 
undergo the procedure when having children, even if it is free.189 Second, 
insurers will see cost savings because of the reduction in the manifestation 
of these genetic illnesses in later years. The reason insurers have not 
 
substantive due process claims--situated in a rights-based frame--may encompass 
concerns related to inequality and group subordination.” (footnotes omitted)). 
185. Id. at 1198. 
186. Id. at 1199 (“The answers to these questions are never simple. Creating a baseline 
for health insurance inevitably excludes certain kinds of coverage, thereby leaving 
some individuals with less than optimal access to health care.”). 
187. Rosenthal, supra note 163, at 2208 (“To avoid the demands of strict scrutiny, one 
might instead conclude that any preference favoring women or minorities is 
constitutionally unobjectionable, but a jurisprudence willing to uphold any kind of 
racial preference favoring minority groups has no logical stopping point--precisely 
the reason the Court has rejected preferences designed to remediate societal 
discrimination.” (footnote omitted)). 
188. As Sidney Watson writes, “Broad statements prohibiting facially neutral policies 
and practices that have an unjustified disparate racial impact do not give health 
insurers, health care providers, the agency, or courts sufficient guidance on how 
to strike the proper balance between equity concerns and economic and profit 
motives.” Watson, supra note 148, at 860. 
189. See About Cystic Fibrosis, CYSTIC FIBROSIS FOUND., https://www.cff.org/What-is-
CF/About-Cystic-Fibrosis/ (last visited July 26, 2016) (estimating that .0001% of 
the U.S. population is afflicted with Huntington’s disease and .00009% is afflicted 
with Cystic Fibrosis); Stephanie Liou, Population Genetics and Huntington’s 
Disease, HUNTINGTON’S OUTREACH PROJECT EDUC. STAN. (Oct. 26, 2010), 
http://web.stanford.edu/group/hopes/cgi-bin/hopes_test/population-genetics-
and-hd/#the-frequency-of-hd. 
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implemented coverage already, given the cost savings, is that they may 
never see those cost savings. If insurers spend money on therapeutic PGD 
and produce a child without genetic illness, the child may be covered by a 
different insurer when the cost savings are realized. Yet if all insurers are 
required to cover therapeutic PGD, they will all see the cost savings later, 
even if the children selected through PGD that they paid for are not the 
healthy children or adults they later cover and see the cost savings from. 
The ACA thus presents a collective action fix to an insurance problem. 
The ACA requires health insurance plans to cover, without cost sharing, 
preventive health services, and it specifically provides for such care and 
screenings for women and children.190 The statute states: 
A group health plan and a health insurance issuer offering group or 
individual health insurance coverage shall, at a minimum, provide 
coverage for and shall not impose any cost sharing requirements for- 
(1) evidence-based items or services that have in effect a rating of “A” 
or “B” in the current recommendations of the United States 
Preventive Services Task Force; . . . 
(3) with respect to infants, children, and adolescents, evidence-
informed preventive care and screenings provided for in the 
comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and 
Services Administration. 
(4) with respect to women, such additional preventive care and 
screenings not described in paragraph (1) as provided for in 
comprehensive guidelines supported by the Health Resources and 
Services Administration for purposes of this paragraph.191 
The statute also prohibits annual or lifetime limits on per-beneficiary 
health benefits by an insurance plan for any “essential health benefits 
under section 18022(b) of this title.”192 The Secretary has discretion to 
 
190. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(2)-(3) (2012); This provision of the ACA has been the 
subject of recent litigation in which the mandates for preventative services in the 
form of contraceptives created under the provision were challenged as violating 
religious freedom. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) 
(upholding an as-applied challenge to the contraceptive mandate as substantially 
burdening the exercise of religion of the companies forced to provide health 
insurance coverage for such services). 
191. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-13(a)(1)-(4) (footnote omitted). 
192. 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-11 (“(a) Prohibition (1) In general – A group health plan and a 
health insurance offering group or individual health insurance coverage may not 
establish--(A) lifetime limits on the dollar value of benefits for any participant or 
beneficiary; or (B) except as provided in paragraph (2), annual limits on the dollar 
value of benefits for any participant or beneficiary . . . . (b) Per beneficiary limits – 
Subsection (a) shall not be construed to prevent a group health plan or health 
insurance coverage from placing annual or lifetime per beneficiary limits on 
specific covered benefits that are not essential health benefits under section 
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define “essential health benefits” with a few limitations.193 Essential health 
benefits must include, among other enumerated items, maternity and 
newborn care and preventive and wellness services.194 In addition, essential 
health benefits must be “equal to the scope of benefits provided under a 
typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary.”195 Yet, among other 
“[r]equired elements for consideration” when defining essential health 
benefits, “the Secretary shall . . . (C) take into account the health care needs 
of diverse segments of the population, including women, children, persons 
with disabilities, and other groups.”196 
My argument here is that there is room for an administrative-law 
solution to the socioeconomic and moral quandary I presented above with 
the Baker and Smith families. The ACA’s focus on providing preventive 
health services, particularly for women and children, which includes 
classifying them as essential health benefits not subject to per-beneficiary 
annual or lifetime limits, allows the Secretary to include IVF and PGD to 
screen out genetic diseases among such preventive health services for 
women and children. In addition, the requirement that the Secretary 
consider the “health care needs of diverse segments of the population, 
including . . . other groups”197 is an avenue for regulations that consider the 
health needs of the poor, which–though admittedly including many other 
urgent needs–surely includes the need not to pass preventable genetic 
diseases to their children.198 
 
18022(b) of this title, to the extent that such limits are otherwise permitted under 
Federal or State law.”). 
193. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1). 
194. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(1)(D), (I). 
195. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(2)(A) (“The Secretary shall ensure that the scope of the 
essential health benefits under paragraph (1) is equal to the scope of benefits 
provided under a typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary. To inform 
this determination, the Secretary of Labor shall conduct a survey of employer-
sponsored coverage to determine the benefits typically covered by employers, 
including multiemployer plans, and provide a report on such survey to the 
Secretary.”). 
196. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4). 
197. 42 U.S.C. § 18022(b)(4)(C). 
198. See Jason Potter Burda, When Condoms Fail: Making Room under the ACA Blanket 
for PrEP HIV Prevention, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 171, 227 (2015) (arguing that HHS 
should require health plan administrators to consider the needs of subpopulations 
at high risk for HIV, such as men who have sex with men, by covering PrEP (oral 
HIV pre-exposure prophylactic medication)); Daar I, supra note 8, at 265 (“[T]he 
current limited access to PGD should be addressed not by denying the available 
technology to the few who can afford it, but by ensuring wider access for all. 
Concern for the genetic health of one’s children is not a value limited to parents 
with resources; it is a universal value that can only be fully realized in a society 
that devotes its scarce resources to providing the most up to date technologies to 
everyone.”); Sarah E. Gage, Note, The Transgender Eligibility Gap: How the ACA 
Fails to Cover Medically Necessary Treatment for Transgender Individuals and How 
HHS Can Fix It, 49 NEW ENG. L. REV. 499, 511-13 (2015) (arguing that section 
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This provision, section 18022(b)(4)(C), requiring that the Secretary 
decide EHBs by looking in part to the needs of diverse subpopulations, 
means that insurance carriers’ calculations cannot simply include the most 
cost-effective benefits or those that have the largest benefit to the 
population overall because “appropriately considering the needs of 
subgroups requires deviating from the strict pursuit of total benefit.”199 A 
key question moving forward is “which ‘diverse segments’ are relevant.”200 
The ACA does not address infertility treatment coverage, nor do any 
subsequent HHS regulations under the statute. HHS allows states to 
incorporate their own EHB standards into the insurance plans they regulate, 
and fifteen states mandate some amount of coverage for infertility 
treatments.201 While some studies have shown that requiring private 
insurance to cover fertility treatments does not increase the use of those 
treatments significantly,202 this is likely because the population covered by 
private insurance (particularly pre-ACA) is wealthier and already has access 
to ARTs. This evidence shows that demand is being suppressed by the high 
cost of ARTs for those without insurance coverage. 
Many will be concerned with the government mandating coverage for 
fertility treatments. I therefore move next to addressing the implications of 
mandating such coverage for therapeutic PGD and, importantly, the 
implications if we do not adopt such coverage. 
B.  Lack of Access as Eugenics 
My argument in this article is subject to three main, not unrelated, 
critiques: (1) many or most of those who cannot afford PGD, and ARTs more 
broadly, do not want access, and requiring access through health insurance 
will coerce them into utilizing the procedures, (2) providing access to PGD 
 
18022(b)(4)(C) of the ACA is an avenue to increase gender-confirming care for 
transgender people, although other provisions harm this effort). 
199. Persad, supra note 160, at 147; Id. at 166 (The ACA’s provisions “are potentially 
dangerous: to the extent that they promote a view that considerations of cost and 
effectiveness are completely outweighed by the gain of even a moment of life, 
they threaten the possibility of achieving the healthcare system we need--one 
that supports public health while reining in rising costs . . . . Taking seriously the 
challenge that the ACA’s provisions pose requires a health care system that does 
justice to the complexity of our values.”). 
200. Id. at 147 (“[F]actors . . . such as race, color, national origin, gender, gender 
identify, and sexual orientation, are somewhat less likely to produce debate” than 
factors “clearly relevant to medical practice, such as age and disability.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
201. Mastroianni, supra note 7, at 153-54 (“Specifically, [ ]HHS proposed a policy in 
December 2011 that provided states with ‘the flexibility to select . . . benchmark 
plan[s]’ based upon typical insurance coverage plans within the state. On February 
27, 2015, [ ]HHS renewed this policy through 2017.” (second and third alterations 
in original) (footnotes omitted)). 
202. Judith F. Daar, Accessing Reproductive Technologies: Invisible Barriers, Indelible 
Harms, 23 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 18, 37 (2008) [hereinafter Daar III]. 
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for one illness or trait creates pressure to provide access to PGD for another 
illness or trait, and providing access to one ART creates pressure to provide 
access to another ART, in an endless line-drawing exercise, and (3) 
increasing access to and use of therapeutic PGD will stigmatize those with 
disabilities or illnesses in society. None of these concerns outweigh the 
growing reality that lack of access to PGD and ARTs generally is becoming a 
form of reverse eugenics in this country, or the “new eugenics” as Judith 
Daar calls it in her recent book,203 but I explore each in detail below before 
asserting that these critiques are allowing an invidious model of eugenics 
to take hold. 
Dorothy Roberts argues that maintaining genetic ties is a focus of 
whites, while government policies discourage black women from having 
children.204 If genetic ties are important mainly to whites, is it racist to 
encourage or coerce the genetic tie in minorities through subsidies? In the 
face of a grave, genetic illness, there is the choice to test and abort any 
affected fetus, to adopt children, to use a sperm or egg donor, or to not 
have children at all. Why choose this policy of subsidized assisted 
reproductive technology? 
My answer once again comes back to choice. First, we have no accurate 
way of knowing what the poor, including minorities, want in this situation 
because they have no access and, therefore, no real choice.205 Racial bias 
 
203. Daar II, supra note 77. Daar argues that “the true eugenic effect of ART is not in 
its use but in its deprivation.” Id. at 192. She compares the effects of numerous 
economic and social barriers to ART to historical eugenic policies that prevented 
supposed undesirables from reproducing and concludes that the impact is similar 
because both the old and new forms of eugenics “depriv[e] them [of] the 
opportunity to reproduce in unison with more favored populations.” Id. 
204. Roberts I, supra note 1, at 944 (“The monumental effort, expense and 
technological invention that goes into the new reproduction marks the children 
produced as especially valuable. It proclaims the unmistakable message that white 
children are precious enough to devote billions of dollars towards their creation. 
Black children, on the other hand, are the primary object of welfare reform 
measures designed to discourage poor women from procreation.”); Roberts III, 
supra note 85, at 213 (“At a time when wealthy white women have access to 
technologies designed to produce genetically screened babies, an assortment of 
laws and policies discourage women of color from having babies at all.”). But see 
Janet L. Dolgin, Biological Evaluations: Blood, Genes, and Family, 41 AKRON L. REV. 
347, 364 (2008) (arguing that as “nontraditional families-of-choice” have 
proliferated, genetic ties have become “an essential component of personal and 
group identity” (footnote omitted)). The possibility remains, then, that genetic 
ties are increasingly prevalent as a way to bind nontraditional families. Genetic 
ties may be more of a focus for whites in that case simply because minorities lack 
access to assisted reproduction. It is possible that Roberts has the flow of 
causation wrong, and increased use of ARTs is not a result of the importance of 
genetic ties to whites but instead a result of the increasing number of 
nontraditional families who increasingly value those ties. 
205. See Daar III, supra note 202, at 38-43 (discussing higher rates of infertility among 
minorities but lower rates of treatment due to lower socioeconomic status and 
correspondingly lower rates of health insurance and higher rates of physician bias 
and distrust of the healthcare system). Although research has focused on gaps in 
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operates both explicitly and implicitly in healthcare to affect the diagnoses 
and treatments minorities receive. As Ruqaiijah Yearby writes, “The largest 
disparity in accessing quality health care and health status in the United 
States remains between African-Americans and Caucasians.”206 It is difficult 
to gauge the preferences of racial minorities who have a gene for a serious 
illness and cannot afford PGD without giving them access. While it is 
possible that some will then use the procedure out of a sense that society 
demands they produce “healthy” children and they will be ostracized if they 
do otherwise, it is more coercive to deny access to a choice than to subsidize 
it.207 
Viewing funding for PGD as coercive requires an assumption that the 
baseline is a lack of funding for assisted reproduction and an unequal 
distribution of wealth within society.208 If, instead, the unequal distribution 
of resources is conceived of as a result of laws that concentrate wealth 
among a small percentage of the population and particularly disadvantage 
 
the utilization rates of fertility treatments between whites and minorities, without 
equal funding, it is pure speculation to assume that their interest level differs. 
206. Yearby, supra note 6, at 1285-87 (footnote omitted) (“Racial bias in health care 
operates on three different levels: interpersonal, institutional, and structural. 
Interpersonal bias is the conscious (explicit) and/or unconscious (implicit) use of 
prejudice in interactions between individuals. [Gives example of doctors making 
different treatment decisions that result in higher mortality rates for African-
Americans than Caucasians.] . . . Institutional bias operates through 
organizational structures within institutions, which ‘establish separate and 
independent barriers’ to health care services. [Gives example of hospital closures 
in African-American communities.] . . . Finally, operating at a societal level, 
structural bias exists in the organizational structure of society, which ‘privile[ges] 
some groups . . . [while] denying others access to the resources of society,’ 
including health care. [Gives example of health care based on ability to pay instead 
of needs of patients.]” (fifth, sixth, and seventh alterations in original) (footnotes 
omitted)). 
207. But see Roberts III, supra note 85, at 221 (“Making citizens responsible for 
managing their health at the genetic level reflects the shift of responsibility for 
public welfare from the state to the private realms of market and family . . . . 
Today, state genetic testing programs do not force citizens to participate. Instead 
the government and corporate sectors rely on the sense of obligation individuals 
feel to control their own health at the genetic level. Turning people into ‘gene 
carriers’ concentrates responsibility on them to manage their own genetic 
predispositions, shifting the spotlight away from state responsibility for ensuring 
healthy living conditions.”). 
208. See Sunstein, supra note 51, at 895 (“[T]he existing distribution is not natural and 
does not provide a neutral baseline; it resulted in part from government decisions; 
efforts to improve the lot of the disadvantaged fall comfortably within the police 
power, should not be treated as impermissibly partisan, and may even be 
constitutionally compelled, especially where there is racial discrimination on the 
face of a statute.”). 
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minorities, then funding is merely an effort to get us back to the baseline of 
equality and remove the coercive effects of such maldistribution.209 
It is, of course, possible that increased public funding will not result in 
increased use of therapeutic PGD by the poor and minorities who currently 
use ART in far lower numbers than wealthy whites, even if they can afford 
the procedures.210 There is no doubt, however, that public funding is 
necessary to overcome financial and social barriers to equal access to this 
treatment. As Dorothy Roberts writes, “It is hard to imagine a multimillion 
dollar industry designed to create Black children.”211 The government, 
therefore, has a responsibility to ensure that society does not entrust the 
creation of healthier children to private industry. 
The second critique, related to the first, argues that because covering 
therapeutic PGD essentially requires drawing lines between acceptable and 
unacceptable uses of PGD and favored or subsidized ARTs and disfavored 
ARTs, no line should be drawn at all, no subsidies should be given, or all use 
of the technology should be prohibited. This critique is informed by the 
question of where to draw the line for the negative right to be free from 
interference with reproductive liberty. Samuel Bagenstos writes that “we 
confront a classic Legal Realist baseline problem: all choices are made under 
an array of constraints, so the government will always have some plausible 
argument for regulating to promote choice. And the notion of autonomy, 
by itself, will not provide a basis for rejecting any such regulation.”212 He 
concludes that the normative question is: “What kinds of (publicly or 
privately imposed) constraints are we going to treat as rendering a choice 
unfree)?”213 Subsidizing certain uses of PGD and certain ARTs overall will 
inevitably favor those now free choices. Society must weigh which traits it 
is ethically and financially appropriate to subsidize deselecting. Lines are 
always being drawn in health insurance coverage. 
On the last critique, disability rights advocates have joined pro-life 
activists in their opposition to expanding access to therapeutic PGD out of 
fear that it would stigmatize those with disabilities or illnesses in society. 
They argue that the practice incorporates “discriminatory attitudes about 
disability, and that any ‘choice’ will not be a free one in light of social 
 
209. Id. at 917-18 (discussing Lochner era’s continuing effect on common law because 
it assumes that the “current distribution of benefits and burdens along racial lines 
is simply ‘there’”). 
210. Roberts II, supra note 9, at 245 (“Yet there is a stark racial disparity in the use of 
new reproductive technologies that seems to result from a complex interplay of 
financial barriers, physician referrals, and cultural preferences.”). 
211. Id. at 246. 
212. Bagenstos I, supra note 79, at 442 (footnotes omitted) (discussing position of 
disability rights advocates on abortion regulation). 
213. Id. at 451-52 (acknowledging that financial constraints may effectively prevent a 
poor woman from exercising her right to an abortion but stating that “[i]n a 
capitalist society . . . the government has no general affirmative obligation to 
provide for its citizens” (footnote omitted)). 
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pressures” including physician bias and social stigma.214 While those who 
are not disabled often believe that the disabled lead a tortured and 
abnormal existence, most of the disabled do not view their lives that way, 
or would not in the absence of the social stigma.215 
Disability rights activists have spoken out frequently against the use of 
genetic testing to selectively abort fetuses with genetic mutations that 
result in illness or disability. Their concern is the fulfillment of “the 
eugenicist’s dream of eliminating disabilities by eliminating people with 
disabilities.”216 If the number of disabled people decreases, their voice and 
push against discrimination is reduced, and it becomes easier to 
continuously isolate them and reduce their numbers further in society.217 
I share the concern that deselecting embryos (in the case of PGD) with 
a gene that results in a high likelihood of disability at birth or later in life will 
stigmatize the disabled and is the product of incomplete information and 
physician bias at times. Yet, if we assume that the wealthy will continue to 
use this procedure for this purpose (a likely assumption), failing to subsidize 
PGD for the poor results in a disabled population that is stigmatized by 
society’s views on both disability and poverty. It seems more likely to me 
that prejudice against the disabled will grow as the wealthy opt out and the 
disabled population is increasingly poor. If poor parents want to opt out as 
well, it should not be acceptable for society to place the weight of the moral 
quandary inherent in deselecting for disabilities on their shoulders. The 
argument that we should not subsidize therapeutic PGD because it will 
stigmatize the disabled is only valid if we prohibit the use of PGD for 
everyone.218 
Historically, “[e]ugenicists believed that most social problems were 
caused by hereditary faults of those afflicted by the problem, and they 
eventually sought to eliminate these societal problems through selective 
 
214. Id. at 428-37 (discussing disability rights critique in the examples of withholding 
treatment from infants with disabilities and assisted suicide). 
215. Id. at 435-37 (“Disability rights advocates have long argued that the proper 
remedy for such stigmatization is not medical treatment to eliminate disabilities-
-and certainly not medical interventions to eliminate people with disabilities--but 
is instead guarantees of civil rights to change the hostile and inaccessible aspects 
of society.” (footnote omitted)). This argues in favor of education as part of true 
reproductive liberty instead of banning PGD; But see Vuko Andrić & Joachim 
Wündisch, Is It Bad to be Disabled? Adjudicating Between the Mere-Difference and 
the Bad-Difference Views of Disability, 9 J. ETHICS & SOC. PHIL. 1, 1 (2015). 
216. Bagenstos I, supra note 79, at 439 (footnote omitted). 
217. Id. at 439-41 (noting that the prescription of many disability rights advocates is 
not the elimination of abortion, however, but requiring physicians to provide 
unbiased information about the lives of the disabled and their value to those 
seeking to abort fetuses with genetic abnormalities). 
218. Perhaps some balance is found in comparing my argument here in favor of the use 
of therapeutic PGD in a way that will arguably stigmatize the disabled with Jessica 
Roberts’s view that the ACA is a civil rights law for the disabled. See Jessica L. 
Roberts, Health Law as Disability Rights Law, 97 MINN. L. REV. 1963, 1964 (2013). 
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breeding.”219 Therapeutic PGD and other ARTs targeted to screen out 
genetic disease and chromosome abnormalities target narrow illnesses and 
conditions and seek to eliminate them. Instead of blaming more complex 
social problems on genetics, the technology seeks to blame Huntington’s 
disease (for example) on the gene that produces the disease and eliminate 
its manifestation in the population. The question is not only whether it 
means a return to our eugenic past to engage in this practice and seek to 
eliminate disabilities,220 but also what it means to eliminate bad genes only 
in the wealthy, white population this time. We have given rise to a 
movement for reverse eugenics. 
Judith Daar writes about the practical “barriers” that create a “modern-
day eugenics,” including cost and race.221 She argues that: 
[s]o long as ART remains a private good that, without legal 
consequence, is withheld from the least well-off among us, birth by 
assisted conception will take on a eugenic quality – one that rivals the 
goals of the earlier movement to repress breeding by those deemed 
unworthy of dynastic participation in the human race.222 
I assert here that lack of access is oppressive and needs to be viewed as an 
affirmative harm. 
The failure to find a positive right to this technology is allowing current 
income inequality to grow in a way that many feel uncomfortable discussing 
because of its ableist origins. If we cannot prohibit wealthy whites from 
using this technology or decide that we should not do so because of the 
good that the technology achieves or the importance of reproductive 
choice, then the poor—including a disproportionate share of minorities—
will be made to bear the cost of caring for those with genetic illnesses or 
chromosome abnormalities. 
 
219. Daar III, supra note 202, at 78-80 (discussing terrible “legacy of state control over 
procreation” through forced sterilization and its impact on ART). 
220. See, e.g., Mary B. Mahowald, Aren’t We All Eugenicists?: Commentary on Paul 
Lombardo’s “Taking Eugenics Seriously”, 30 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 219, 220 (2003); 
Michael J. Malinowski, Choosing the Genetic Makeup of Children: Our Eugenics 
Past-Present, and Future?, 36 CONN. L. REV. 125, 130 (2003); Michelle Oberman, 
Thirteen Ways of Looking at Buck v. Bell: Thoughts Occasioned by Paul Lombardo’s 
Three Generations, No Imbeciles, 59 J. LEGAL EDUC. 357, 358 (2010). 
221. Daar III, supra note 202, at 81 (“But isn’t the deprivation of reproductive 
opportunity just as coercive as any formal, explicit directive to forgo offspring? . . . 
The coercive eugenic nature of ART barriers comes into sharp focus upon 
inspection of the individuals whose access to assisted conception is most 
suppressed--poor, minority, unmarried individuals who historically lack political 
and economic power. These are the very persons, who like their early twentieth 
century counterparts, are not terribly welcome in a society that measures human 
improvement by its ability to coalesce around a set of homogeneous 
characteristics.”). 
222. Id.; see Daar II, supra note 77, at xiv (“This exercise of procreative deprivation is 
eugenic to the core.”). 
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Conclusion 
Unequal access to healthcare is nothing new.223 However, economic 
inequality has, in recent months, moved up on our country’s list of 
priorities. With that change comes new openings for combatting inequality 
in access to healthcare. The next step is to fix the access problem in ART, 
with the most immediate need in the area of therapeutic PGD.224 The time 
has come for health-law scholars and courts to declare that there is no 
liberty in reproductive rights without equal access. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
223. MEHLMAN & BOTKIN, supra note 24, at 61-62 (“An examination of our health care 
system shows that, regardless of how unpopular it may be to give people 
preferences on the basis of their social status, we are willing to tolerate a 
significant degree of unequal access to health care based on wealth.”). 
224. Daar I, supra note 9, at 271-72 (“For parents who use PGD to avoid passing a 
deleterious genetic disorder to a child, their quest is not one for perfection, but 
rather for normalcy within health parameters. Choosing not to birth children with 
serious illnesses seems consistent with natural parental instincts to protect 
offspring from pain and suffering. To view the use of PGD for medical selection as 
a desire to enhance our children beyond that which human nature currently 
contemplates is to suggest that parents who seek cures for their ailing children 
wrongfully challenge the natural order of life. If we cannot imagine denying 
parents the right to seek cures and therapies for their ailing children, why should 
we imagine a system for denying parents the right to ensure the health of their 
children before they are born?”). 
